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a. Executive Summary 
The pharmaceutical industry has since inception in the late 19th century contributed a range 
of health interventions that have improved and extended the quality of life of people around 
the world.  Despite international recognition of the legal and moral right to health, one third 
of the global population today still lacks access to essential medicines, with a concentration 
in developing countries.1  Improving access to essential medicines could save 10 million 
lives each year.2  Essential medicines include medicines that satisfy the priority health care 
needs of a particular population based on considerations of disease prevalence, efficiency, 
safety and cost-effectiveness.3  
The Access to Medicine Index (ATMi) represents a recently developed mechanism designed 
to evaluate the performance of the pharmaceutical sector in terms of promoting access to 
essential medicines.  In 2012, the third ATMi was published by the Access to Medicine 
Foundation (ATMf).  The ATMi represents the most holistic attempt to date to benchmark 
the performance of the global pharmaceutical sector in terms of access to essential medicines.  
Important distinguishing features of the index include an objective and independent body to 
mediate between different stakeholders, a transparent evaluation framework and access to 
sensitive pharmaceutical company information not otherwise publicly accessible. 
The ATMi has contributed to positive changes in the pharmaceutical sector, particularly in 
relation to internal governance.  The ATMi may also have contributed indirect value to the 
pharmaceutical industry by mitigating pressure and adverse publicity from civil society, to 
the extent that it has convincingly captured their social responsibilities and activities in 
improving access to medicines.  However, the future effectiveness of the index in promoting 
substantive change across the pharmaceutical sector will be dependent on its ability to 
meaningfully engage and empower diverse stakeholders.  Key stakeholders include 
governmental/intergovernmental agencies, investors, pharmaceutical sector, health care 
professionals, public, procurement groups, and civil society.  Pharmaceutical companies will 
only continue to improve if the benefits are perceived to be greater than the costs of 
                                                 
1 (H. Hogerzeil & Mirza, 2011 p.5) 
2 (Hunt, 2009 p.4) 
3 (WHO, 2012a, p. 16) 
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responding to the ATMi information needs and adapting practices.  Currently, only 
pharmaceutical companies that perform well on the ATMi are publicly acknowledging the 
index results, a potential reflection of its perceived value.  The ATMi needs to resonate with 
and unite diverse stakeholders in order for the perceived benefits to outweigh the costs of 
continuous improvement by the pharmaceutical sector. 
This report notes a number of opportunities for the ATMi to improve its engagement with 
stakeholders.  The current level of engagement between the ATMf and stakeholders, at least 
on a public level, is not strong.  Consistent with the values the ATMi desires to encourage 
across the pharmaceutical sector, it must also espouse greater levels of objectivity, 
accountability, transparency and collaboration in order to further contribute to addressing the 
challenge of access to essential medicines.  
Simplifying the measurement framework would enhance stakeholder understanding:  
Specifying higher standards with clearer signals of best practice and a greater focus on 
outcomes would further differentiate performance and reduce the number of indicators 
required.  Examples include compliance with leading standards such as the International 
Standards for Clinical Trial Registries and WHO Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice, and 
requiring greater levels of public disclosure.  Greater standardization of ATMi indicators 
across strategic pillars would more effectively align measures and simplify the analysis of 
company strengths and weaknesses.  More specific and verifiable measures would also 
improve the ability of stakeholders to understand and trust the ATMi evaluation framework. 
Strengthening the measurement framework in terms of measures, weighting and focus 
would enhance accuracy and completeness of findings: The ATMi should incorporate 
additional measures to more completely and accurately capture the performance of 
pharmaceutical companies concerning greater disclosure, governance, and ethical practices.  
Additional measures include greater disclosure of donation tax benefits and joint public 
private initiative governance transparency and conditions, higher ethical practices in terms of 
transparent product labeling and distribution traceability, and greater leading access practices 
in terms of expanding research into pediatric formulations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement.  Greater consistency in disease and medicine focus would ensure limited 
resources of ATMi are most effectively targeted.  Currently, the ATMi includes in its disease 
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scope tetanus and measles for which first line prevention and treatment includes vaccines and 
symptomatic relief that are out of scope.  The weighting allocation needs to more accurately 
reflect the priorities of improving access to essential medicines.  Currently, only 4.0% of the 
total score for each company is attributable to breaches of conduct and litigation in relation to 
lobbying, marketing, bribery, corruption, clinical trials and anti-competitive behavior.  The 
analysis of the ATMi should incorporate the perspectives of people living in developing 
countries, and more flexibly consider alternative local approaches rather than prescribing top-
down global solutions by for instance acknowledging local generic business unit production. 
Greater transparency would strengthen the credibility of results: The ATMi does not 
disclose indicator level scores unlike other third-party previous attempts to benchmark the 
pharmaceutical sector, such as the 2006 Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility AIDS 
study.  Greater levels of disclosure would facilitate more alignment with alternate third party 
measures of pharmaceutical sector performance, thereby enhancing the credibility of the 
ATMi.  Disaggregated indicator ratings are important for stakeholders to analyze and 
validate findings from different vantage points of accountability.  The lack of absolute 
performance transparency can erode the perceived credibility of the ATMi by not facilitating 
independent validation.  
Greater disclosure and analytical tools would more effectively inform stakeholders:  
More complete and detailed disclosure of company information would make the ATMi a 
more trusted and complete measure of industry performance.  For example, the ATMi did not 
acknowledge the global advocacy campaign in 12 countries to challenge Abbott 
Laboratories’ monopolistic hold on Kaletra.  ATMi reporting of company performance by 
technical area and company report cards needs to provide more depth, balance and context.  
Currently, the ATMi focuses on providing performance summaries centered on the two year 
period under evaluation, without providing further company information depth or supporting 
external links on its website.  Visualization and data analysis tools would enhance the ability 
of stakeholders to evaluate performance over time across different criteria.  Further, the rapid 
developments across the pharmaceutical sector require more frequent reporting to provide 
relevant and accurate information to users.   
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Additional distinct measures would enhance insight on access to essential medicines 
bottlenecks: A complementary and distinct measure is required to provide insight on the 
affordability and availability of generic drugs by placing a focus on the level of competition 
that exists to ensure generic drugs are available, cheap and of sufficient quality.  Distribution 
companies, biotechnology companies, and small and medium sized enterprises represent 
important industry stakeholders in increasing access to essential medicines that need to be 
continuously monitored through website industry updates to encourage positive contributions 
and discourage activities that limit access to essential medicines.  An additional index also 
needs to be developed that evaluates the infrastructure, policies and distribution network of 
each country in terms of access to essential medicines to draw attention to suboptimal 
government policies.   
  9
b. Policy / research question 
This paper explores the role of the pharmaceutical sector in improving access to essential 
medicines in developing countries and the optimal mechanisms to maximize corporate social 
responsibility for ensuring innovation and access to meet the public health needs of those in 
low-income and lower-middle-income countries.  While the pharmaceutical sector alone 
cannot solve the global challenge of access to essential medicines, it represents an important 
stakeholder and catalyst for positive change.  The global pharmaceutical sector is fragmented 
in terms of market share, production and research and development, presenting a strong 
opportunity for a scorecard mechanism to standardize and benchmark performance in terms 
of access to essential medicines.  The policy question addressed in this thesis focuses on the 
Access to Medicine Index (ATMi) as a mechanism to change pharmaceutical practices:  
Can a global scorecard framework promote a system of public accountability 
across the pharmaceutical sector to support increased access to essential 
medicines in developing countries?   
c. Background 
The ATMi evaluates one segment of the pharmaceutical sector, originator pharmaceutical 
companies, in terms of their activities related to access to essential medicines.  The objective 
of the ATMi is to leverage the potential of the pharmaceutical sector in reducing the global 
burden of disease by promoting greater transparency and objectivity and enhancing multi-
stakeholder collaboration.  The human right to health is a widely accepted norm that over the 
last decade has been progressively embraced by the pharmaceutical sector.  The ATMi as an 
actionable governance indicator is attempting to play a catalytic role in positively shaping the 
pharmaceutical sector by clearly defining and benchmarking practices to societal 
expectations.     
i. Access to essential medicines 
Since 1977, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been publishing a model list of 
essential medicines to guide national governments.  The essential medicine list has grown 
from 204 medicines to 358 in 2011 and it is approximated that 2-6% of the medicines listed 
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are under patent protection.4 5  “The medicines included in the WHO Model List of Essential 
Medicines are selected with regard to disease prevalence, evidence of safety and efficacy, 
and comparative cost-effectiveness.  As costs of medicines change over time, the price of a 
medicine is not a reason to exclude it from the WHO Model List if it meets the other stated 
selection criteria.”6  The small number of patent-protected medicines on the model list may 
be reflective of the inhibiting factor of cost and ultimately patents and / or the lack of novel, 
patented medicines with value-added therapeutic efficacy against those diseases comprising 
the greatest burden of disease; the list “…is replete with antiquated and increasingly 
ineffective drugs…[and includes]…less than 2 per cent (21) of the 1,377 drugs indicated for 
global diseases [between 1975 and 1999]”7   
WHO estimates that 30,000 children die each day from diseases that could be easily treated 
with a basic range of essential medicines.8  At least one third of the global population does 
not have access to medicines, with rates being above 50% for certain developing countries.9 
10  Factors that limit the delivery of effective, safe and quality medicines when and where 
needed include: high cost; inefficient distribution; limited health infrastructure; limited health 
financing; narrow disease focus; inequitable health financing mechanisms; limited research 
and development pipeline; lack of data and coordination; limited quality controls; and 
ineffective practices (refer to Appendix i for further details on each limitation to access to 
essential medicines). 
ii. The global burden of disease 
The global burden of disease is a measure of the impact of disease upon the lives of different 
populations around the world based on the disability-adjusted-life-year (DALY).  DALY 
captures the loss of the equivalent of one full year of health and is based on a combination of 
years of life lost due to death and equivalent years of life lost through living in states of less 
                                                 
4 (WHO, 2012a) 
5 (DFID, 2005 p.20) 
6 (WHO, 2012a) 
7 (Maxwell, 2006 p.71-72) 
8 (WHO, 2009 p.4) 
9 (H. Hogerzeil & Mirza, 2011 p.1) 
10 (DFID, 2005 p.17) 
  11
than full health.  The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) distinguishes 
three different types of diseases  (refer to Appendix ii for a definition of Type I, II and III 
diseases).11  Diseases can be segmented by geography, communicable versus non-
communicable and type (refer to Appendix iii for an analysis of the global burden of 
disease).   
iii. The human right to health 
The human right to health represents a legal and moral claim against states and transnational 
corporations, however the field of human rights medicine is generally perceived to be in its 
infancy.  The human rights movement is argued to have only commenced with the 
Nuremberg trials, with human rights law primarily focused on civil and political rights (refer 
to Appendix iv for further details of the international legal human rights framework).12 
Transnational corporations are recognized as having human right responsibilities under 
international law, though a range of voluntary corporate initiatives continue to play an 
important role in shaping a shared understanding of the right to health.13  Voluntary 
international codes of conduct such as the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) Codes of Practice recognize healthcare and 
wellbeing as being the first priority of pharmaceutical companies.14  The IFMPA reinforces 
some elements of the ATMi, specifically pre-approval of communications and promotions 
and transparency of clinical trials, by monitoring complaints, however the ATMi not only 
prescribes standards and transparency levels, but also directly evaluates performance 
reporting.  Corporate social responsibility initiatives such as Benefit Corporations (B-Corp) 
expand the fiduciary duty of corporations to include consideration of the impact of business 
decisions on workers and communities.15  Additionally, business coalitions such as 
GBCHealth, a coalition of over 200 companies committed to leveraging their resources for a 
                                                 
11 (Sachs, 2001 p.78) 
12 (Farmer, 2003 p.220) 
13 (Wu, 2012 p.98) 
14 (IFPMA, 2012, p. 2) 
15 (BCorps, 2013) 
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healthier world, foster greater private sector collaboration focused on addressing global 
health challenges.   
iv. Pharmaceutical sector response to access to essential medicines 
Over the past decade, multinational pharmaceutical companies have been more active in the 
neglected disease field.  The greater focus on neglected diseases can be attributed to growing 
public awareness of unmet developing country health needs, the establishment of dedicated 
institutes by multinational companies and new public-private partnerships financed by an 
influx of public and philanthropic funds.16  Organizations such as Oxfam, Save the Children, 
VSO, Health Action International, WHO and Médecins Sans Frontières have played an 
important role in drawing global attention to the issue of essential medicine.  Responses by 
the pharmaceutical industry have included greater investment in neglected disease research, 
developing country investment, collaborative product development, improving health care 
delivery systems, differential pricing, patent sharing and voluntary licensing and donations.  
Pharmaceutical responses however have not always resulted in positive impacts; donation 
programs can undermine markets and competition and differential pricing programs can be 
difficult to benchmark absent generic competition, lower tiered prices may still be higher 
than the marginal cost of manufacturing and affordability levels may still be less than the 
marginal cost of manufacturing (refer to Appendix vii for further details on the changes in 
the practices of pharmaceutical companies in providing access to medicine and details on 
their implications).   
v. The access to medicine responsibility of the pharmaceutical sector  
The corporate responsibility for second-order consequences or negative externalities of 
global operations has rapidly evolved.  In the 1990s, significant public attention was placed 
on the overseas manufacturing conditions of companies connected with Nike and the Walt 
Disney Company, as examples.  Attention was particularly focused on the athletic footwear, 
apparel, retail and toy industries, which had high concentrations of sweatshops and human 
right abuses.17  Corporate responsibility has since been evolving to address not only the 
negative impacts of what a company does, but also the consequences of what a company 
                                                 
16 (Mary Moran, Ropars, Guzman, Diaz, & Garrison, September 2005 p.8) 
17 (Sethi, 2003 p.28) 
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does not do.  The rise of corporate philanthropy is a reflection of the importance of positive 
contributions to society to retain talent, strengthen brand, generate innovation and expand 
markets and business relationships.18 
The pharmaceutical industry is an example of one sector for which societal expectations are 
extending beyond minimum ethical standards of practice (refer to Appendix viii for an 
analysis of pharmaceutical sector activities considered important in enhancing access to 
essential medicines).  In fact, societal expectations are extending beyond the making of 
ethical profits, to intentionally limiting profits to satisfy society’s needs.  Pharmaceutical 
companies are perceived as having a special duty to provide aid in the way of essential 
medicines by virtue of the moral character of health-care needs, health as a human right and 
their unique capacity to render aid.19  Arguably, entities involved in the medical field incur 
certain unique responsibilities because of the role they play in sustaining the quality, security 
and integrity of lives.20  Physicians, for example, are expected to provide emergency care 
even when inconvenient and it puts them at risk.21 
“One important counter-argument to this is based on the idea that shareholders in 
pharmaceutical companies have a claim to the profits by agreement, and by the duty of loyalty.  
It is difficult to imagine, however, that the duty to maximize shareholder profits could override 
the duty to save lives, especially in the face of a right.  Rights, after all, trump considerations of 
utility…[Pharmaceutical companies] are subject to…two distinct sets of fiduciary duties: those 
of managers to shareholders, and indirectly, the fiduciary duties of physicians to their 
patients…Patients are dependant on pharmaceutical companies for their life, security and 
welfare, at least as much as they depend on the physician.” 22     
The pharmaceutical sector is comprised of originator pharmaceutical companies, generic 
manufacturers, biotechnology companies, distributors and small and medium sized 
enterprises, existing either independently or in a hybrid form (refer to Appendix vi for a 
detailed analysis of the pharmaceutical industry and its segments).  Each sector of the 
                                                 
18 (Levy, 1999) 
19 (Forman & Kohler, 2012 p.75) 
20 (Forman & Kohler, 2012 p.79) 
21 (Forman & Kohler, 2012 p.79) 
22 (Forman & Kohler, 2012 p.80-81,84) 
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pharmaceutical industry plays a unique and important role in providing access to essential 
medicines.  Initiatives that attempt to change industry practices need to be targeted to specific 
segments to maximize the impact of limited resources.  For example, improving access to 
branded medicines requires a focus on the transparency of research, patents, distribution and 
prices, however improving access to generic medicines requires a focus on promoting 
competition.  The University Global Health Impact Report Cards represents one targeted 
approach that attempts to measure and shape the impact of university policies on global 
health.23   
vi. Catalyzing industry change through governance by transparency 
The ATMi, as an actionable governance indicator (AGI), can play an important role in 
defining societal expectations of an industry consisting of opaque activities and operating 
across diverse business models (refer to Appendix ix and x for an analysis of different 
industry change mechanisms with corresponding examples).  AGIs aggregate information 
from different sources into a format intended to holistically capture and benchmark 
performance to empower user decision-making.  AGIs distill and standardize complex data 
into simple ratings and present the information in a format designed to be user-centered, 
allowing performance to be understood, compared and acted upon.24  AGIs however can 
involve a degree of subjectivity in the weightings and measures applied which can limit the 
ability to action results when not supported by full transparency (refer to Appendix xi for an 
analysis of leading AGI practices).  Additional examples of AGIs include the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), World Bank ‘Doing Business’ (DB), Freedom House ‘Freedom in 
the World’ (FIW), Aid Transparency Index (ATI), and Transparency International 
‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (CPI).  The CDP, DB, FIW, ATI, and CPI report on an 
annual basis as compared to the ATMi that reports on a bi-annual basis.  The DB, ATI and 
CPI reveal source data and full disaggregated scores, the CDP reveals its source data but no 
disaggregated scores, while the FIW and ATMi reveal no source data and only partially 
disaggregated scores.     
                                                 
23 (UGHI, 2013) 
24 (Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007, p. 2) 
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Transparency and public activism today represent increasingly important industry 
governance mechanisms, connected with the rapid development of technology and data 
management platforms.  The internet and mobile devices allow users to access an 
unprecedented level of knowledge almost anywhere, however information disclosure alone is 
not driving change.  Effective targeted transparency policies embed new information into 
users’ and disclosers’ existing decision making routines, based on an understanding of their 
diverse priorities and capacities, to enable action.25  Restaurant hygiene quality cards in Los 
Angeles have been highly embedded in consumer dining decision making by assigning a 
simple letter grade at the front of restaurants, whereas material safety data sheets intended to 
disclose workplace chemical hazards have not been as effective due to their complex 
nature.26  Targeted transparency can mobilize  “…individual choice, market forces and 
participatory democracy through relatively light-handed government action.”27 
vii. The Access to Medicine Index 
The Access to Medicine Index (ATMi) was launched in 2008 by the Access to Medicine 
Foundation (ATMf), a Dutch based international non-profit organization.  The purpose of the 
ATMi is to encourage the pharmaceutical industry to improve access to medicines.  The 
index is intended to provide a reliable, independent and impartial evaluation of the 
performance of pharmaceutical companies across several dimensions (refer to Appendix xii 
for further details on the ATMi and the results in 2010 and 2012). 
The ATMi is building momentum and credibility.  In 2008, nine of the 17 originator firms 
and none of the three generic firms responded to data requests.28  By 2010, 19 of the 20 
originator companies and three out of seven generic companies responded to the ATMi.29  
Recently, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation committed to providing $2,952,852 over four 
years in addition to the $1,095,018 provided in 2009, the Dutch Ministry of Affairs 
committed to a five-year grant, and the British Department for International Development 
                                                 
25 (Fung et al., 2007, p. xiv) 
26 (Fung et al., 2007, pp. 57-61) 
27 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 5) 
28 (AMI, 2010, p. 16) 
29 (AMI, 2010, p. 16) 
  16
committed to a four-year grant.30  The ATMf declined a request as part of this study to reveal 
the level of grant funding it has received. 
d. Research Methodology 
The analytical strategy for this paper consists of a combination of literature reviews, case 
studies and interviews.  Personal interviews and survey tools were utilized to obtain a sample 
of perspectives across global health organizations, human rights organizations focused on 
developing country issues, investors and the pharmaceutical sector (refer to Appendix xiii 
for further details on the interview / survey questions and Section K for the 
acknowledgement of study participants).  This paper focuses on analyzing the effectiveness 
of the ATMi as a mechanism to improve access to essential medicines.  The scope and 
methodology of the ATMi is reviewed, findings benchmarked and its impact analyzed. 
i. ATMi scope and methodology 
Various industry change initiatives are analyzed to place in context the role of actionable 
governance indicators in facilitating change.  Different examples of actionable governance 
indicators are analyzed to identify leading practices and to provide an objective framework 
for evaluating the ATMi.  The scope and methodology of the ATMi is assessed in terms of 
alignment to the objective of measuring, comparing and standardizing pharmaceutical 
practices in order to improve access to essential medicines.  Consideration is provided to the 
theory of change, user centered policies, specified targets, scope and structure, completeness 
of indicators, transparency, complementary measures, measurement errors, comparison of 
performance over time, prioritization and completeness and accuracy. 
Alternative potential frames of focus are considered in light of market share, regional focus, 
donation and research and development tax deduction and credit benefits, potential versus 
actual capacity, upstream versus downstream interventions, pre-competitive versus 
competitive research and development, and people served.  Consideration is also provided to 
collective versus individual measures of company capabilities and performance. 
                                                 
30 (AMI, 2012a) 
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ii. ATMi findings 
ATMi scores and findings are benchmarked on a sample basis to confirm completeness and 
accuracy.  The benchmarking exercise is limited by the lack of full transparency of the 
underlying data of the ATMi and the lack of public information on the activities of the 
pharmaceutical sector.  Benchmarking resources include media reports (e.g. ABN/INFORM 
Complete, Factiva and Lexis/Nexus Academic), databases (e.g. G-Finder and Global 
Socrates - Corporate Social Responsibility), and third party monitors (e.g. Center for Political 
Accountability).  ATMi pharmaceutical company performance scores are correlated to other 
third party performance evaluators by comparing approach and rakings, including the Pacific 
Sustainability Index (PSI), the Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 
Benchmarking AIDS and Oxfam’s Investing for Life.  Gaps in publicly available information 
necessary to evaluate access to essential medicines performance across the pharmaceutical 
sector are additionally noted.   
iii. ATMi impact 
An evaluation is performed of the resonance of the ATMi across the civil sector including 
human rights and global health organizations, investors, pharmaceutical companies and the 
public / consumers.  The analysis consists of interviews as well as a review of share price 
movements, press releases, web search-engine activity, annual reports and corporate social 
responsibility reports, websites and media reports and articles.  A focus is made on 
identifying changes in the activities of companies attributable to the ATMi.  The analysis 
includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement and consensus 
building. 
e. Analysis and Findings 
i. ATMi is shaping pharmaceutical practices, but continued impact is uncertain 
The objective of the ATMi is to “…stimulate positive change by publicly encouraging 
pharmaceutical companies to step up their efforts to improve access to medicine worldwide 
[by supporting] the pharmaceutical industry on a path towards greater transparency, to allow 
companies to develop best practices in access to medicine and to present the outcomes to the 
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outside world.”31  Positive changes have been observed across the pharmaceutical sector in 
response to the ATMi, however the momentum developed and the extent of change observed 
to date has been limited.   
Pharmaceutical companies do appear to be responding to the ATMi; however, changes have 
been limited 
Pharmaceutical companies do appear to a limited degree to be directly responding to the 
ATMi based on an analysis of changes between 2010 and 2012, however attribution is not 
conclusive in the absence of public affirmations by companies of their responses to the index  
(refer to Appendix xxx for more detail on the changes in company performance from 2010 
to 2012 as formally acknowledged by the ATMi in the Access to Medicine Index 2012).  
Although other civil sector organizations focused on access to essential medicines may be 
driving some of the industry changes observed, limited interviews and surveys conducted as 
part of this study affirmed that certain companies were directly responding to the ATMi.  The 
New York Times further noted in April 2013 that pharmaceutical companies were no longer 
ignoring the ATMi by naming executives to ensure they excelled in the index.32  In terms of 
general access to medicine management, GSK, J&J, Sanofi, Merck KGaA and Eisai were 
noted to have created a business unit dedicated to access and / or introduced board-level 
engagement.  For public policy and market influence, GSK, J&J, Novo Nordisk, Novartis, 
Bristol-Myers, Gilead, Eisai and Eli Lilly strengthened their codes of conduct, although 
GSK, J&J and Eli Lilly were also responding to litigation related to recent ethical breaches.  
In terms of research and development, Sanofi, Merck KGaA and Eli Lilly commenced either 
adaptive and / or innovative research for the poor, J&J and Daiichi Sankyo acquired large 
generic developers, and GSK, Merck, Novo Nordisk, Novartis, Roche, Eisai, Boehringer-
Ingelheim, Takeda and Astellas expanded their related research pipeline.  Regarding pricing, 
manufacturing and distribution, GSK, Sanofi, Bayer, Pfizer, Eisai and Daiichi Sankyo (all 
not previous members of the Accelerating Access Initiative) introduced intra- and / or inter-
country pricing schemes and J&J and Merck KGaA disclosed more information on their 
tiered pricing program.  In terms of patents and licensing, J&J, Sanofi, Bayer, Merck and 
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Boehringer-Ingelheim increased the degree of disclosure in support of TRIPS flexibilities 
and / or in flexibly enforcing patents in developing countries and GSK, J&J, Merck and 
Gilead Sciences issued additional non-exclusive voluntary licenses.  However, not all patent 
and licensing changes were positive, with J&J withdrawing from the Medicines Patent Pool 
negotiations, Merck, Novartis and Bayer contesting patent rights in developing countries, and 
Eisai, AstraZenca and Astellas not following through on prior commitments in 2010 to either 
issue non-exclusive voluntary licenses or to not enforce patents in least developed countries.  
Regarding capability advancement in product development and distribution, GSK, J&J, Novo 
Nordisk, Merck KGaA, Abbott, AstraZenca, Boehringer-Ingelheim, and Takeda were noted 
to have created new capacity building partnerships.  In terms of product donations and 
philanthropic activities, Gilead Sciences, Novo Nordisk, and Eisai introduced single-drug 
donation programs and GSK and Sanofi significantly expanded their philanthropic activities.   
Pharmaceutical company public recognition / acknowledgement of ATMi is improving but 
sill limited 
Public recognition of the ATMi by pharmaceutical companies is growing but still considered 
limited (refer to Appendix xxviii for the analysis of public recognition of the 2010 and 2012 
ATMi results in the corporate websites and annual / corporate responsibility reports of 
pharmaceutical companies included in the index).  For the 2010 ATMi, three companies 
acknowledged their ATMi ranking and three acknowledged the existence of the ATMi either 
within their annual or corporate responsibility report.  For the 2012 ATMi, seven companies 
acknowledged the index results, all ranked within the top nine of the index: the top ranking 
company provided a CEO press release; four included a Vice President press release / 
statement and two included web site ranking acknowledgements.  Only one company in the 
ATMi that fell in ranking in 2012 acknowledged the index on their website.  The eleven 
bottom ranked companies in the ATMi did not acknowledge the index results in 2012.   
ii. ATMi is not optimally meeting its objective of promoting multi‐stakeholder 
dialogue 
The objective of the ATMi in terms of stakeholders is “…to supply pharmaceutical 
companies, investors, governments, academics, non-governmental organisations and the 
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general public with independent, balanced and cohesive information on individual 
pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to improve global access to medicine…to provide 
pharmaceutical companies with a transparent means by which they can assess, monitor and 
improve their own performance and their public and investment profile [to] raise awareness 
of relevant issues within pharmaceutical companies and allow other stakeholders to follow 
the industry's progress [and to] highlight industry trends and provide a basis for multi-
stakeholder dialogue and solution-building.”33  Pharmaceutical companies may be 
responding to the index, however the level of competitive advantage gained is questionable 
based on an analysis of investor and public response to the index to date.  Dispersed users of 
the information generated by the ATMi do not appear to be forming political coalitions to 
press effectively for better disclosure and performance.   
Public engagement is limited in concentration and breadth based on analysis of web search 
volume 
An analysis of Google Trends for the search volume associated with ‘Access to Medicine 
Index’ reveals that public interest in the ATMi is concentrated for a short period surrounding 
the publication of the bi-annual index, with interest increasing marginally since 2010.  The 
concentrated volume over short periods could be attributed to the ATMi not explicitly 
targeting consumers / public over time with updated industry sector information.  The ATMf 
has adopted Twitter and LinkedIn and is exploring other social media tools to promote 
greater public engagement.  It is acknowledged that the ATMi actively engages in 
discussions of index results at conferences, lectures and other events. 
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Figure 1: Search volume trends over time associated with ‘Access to Medicine Index’ 
 
Source: Google Trends, February 2013 
Media reports are growing but only marginally over time 
The global media attention surrounding the ATMi was small and concentrated in 2008 and 
has increased marginally since, peaking with the release of each index (refer to Appendix 
xix for the count of media reports containing ‘Access to Medicine Index,’ excluding social 
media).  An analysis of media reports including social media similarly notes a concentration 
of interest across blogs and twitter in the week following the release of the index (refer to 
Appendix xx for the count of media reports containing ‘Access to Medicine Index’ including 
social media).  Evidence was noted that the ATMi is establishing public credibility; IDEA 
Pharma as part of its annual Productive Innovation Index rated Johnson & Johnson first 
partially due to the company’s placement in the ATMi.34   
Investor response is weak with no relationship observed between ATMi and share price 
There does not appear to be any relationship between ATMi rankings and share price 
movements to date, which may reflect the need for more time for the ATMi to gain 
acceptance and credibility in capital markets.  The following analysis consists of general 
rather than statistically significant observations, as the analysis was limited to only three data 
points for 2008, 2010 and 2012.  In 2008 no consistent and significant movements were 
noted in the share prices of the five best and worst ATMi performers immediately after the 
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index was released, although share prices improved for four of the five best performers and 
three of the five worst performers two weeks after publication (refer to Appendix xxi & xxii 
for the indexed share price movements of the best and worst ATMi performers in 2008).  In 
2010 no consistent and significant movements were noted in the share prices of the three best 
performers and two best improvers, and the three worst performers and two worst decreases, 
immediately after the index was released, although share prices generally decreased more for 
the best performers two weeks after publication  (refer to Appendix xxiii & xxiv for the 
indexed share price movements of the best and worst ATMi performers in 2010).  In 2012 no 
consistent and significant movements were again noted in the share prices of the three best 
performers and two best improvers, and the three worst performers and two worst decreases, 
immediately after the index was released, with almost all share prices increasing two weeks 
after publication  (refer to Appendix xxv & xxvi for the indexed share price movements of 
the best and worst ATMi performers in 2012). 
An analysis of the share price movements of the four top and four worst performers of the 
ATMi since 2008 suggests greater market returns for companies consistently ranked higher 
in the index (refer to Appendix xxix for the indexed share price movements of the top four 
and worst four ATMi performers since 2008).  However, Merck & Co is a noted exception 
with its share price performing generally worse or consistent with two of the lowest ranked 
companies in the ATMi.  Additionally, correlation is not necessarily causation, evidenced by 
the lack of consistent and significant share price movements in response to each ATMi 
release. 
The ATMi is building an investor community receptive to the importance of access to 
essential medicines.  In December 2012 the ATMf presented the 2012 ATMi findings to the 
50 top pharmaceutical analysts at three meetings, hosted by Goldman Sachs in London, 
Amundi Asset Management in Paris and MSCI ESG Research in New York.  In June 2011 
29 investors with USD $3.7 trillion under management agreed that access to medicine is 
potentially material to long-term shareholder value creation and to consider the ATMi as 
appropriate in their ESG analysis.  An attempt was made to identify the proportion of assets 
specifically allocated to the pharmaceutical sector by the 29 committed investors, however 
this information was not publicly accessible. 
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Civil sector groups do not appear to be leveraging index results 
Civil sector does not appear to be publicly engaging and leveraging the ATMi over time.  A 
search was performed of a sample of civil sector websites and a Google search was 
additionally performed (combination of the name of each organization with ‘Access to 
Medicine Index’) to identify links to past ATMi reports and an analysis of ATMi results 
(refer to Appendix xxvii for the analysis of civil sector recognition of ATMi results).  Of 26 
civil sector organizations sampled that focused on global health and/or human rights in 
developing countries, only four and one referenced the 2010 and 2012 index reports 
respectively.  Only three organizations were noted to have publicly analyzed the ATMi’s 
findings, Health Action International provided a critique in 2008, Oxfam analyzed the 2010 
results and Pan American Health Organization referenced a related BBC article.   
f. Recommendations 
i. Simplifying the measurement framework would enhance stakeholder 
understanding  
Specifying higher standards of performance would simplify measurement and more 
effectively differentiate practices 
Specifying higher standards of performance would further differentiate practices and reduce 
the number of indicators required (refer to Appendix viii for the pharmaceutical activities 
considered important in enhancing access to essential medicines and Appendix xvii for the 
results of the ATMi indicator evaluation).  Higher standards of performance would negate the 
need for indicators related to the ‘Innovation’ strategic pillar, which serve only to award 
companies additional points for leading practices.  Best practices that receive maximum 
scores should include; more onerous reporting requirements such as actual drug prices by 
product rather than average prices in the lowest and highest pricing tiers  (e.g. ATMi 
indicators A.II.1 and D.II.2); compliance with leading standards such as the International 
Standards for Clinical Trial Registries and WHO Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (e.g. 
C.II.4 and C.III.9); coverage of the full scope of diseases and countries rather than only a 
portion (e.g. B.II.1, D.III.1 and E.I.1); greater levels of public disclosure such as in terms of 
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promotional and marketing policies, activities and costs rather than only requiring disclosure 
to the ATMi (e.g. B.II.5 and C.II.1); higher ethical performance standards such as requiring 
marketing approval and product registration before product launch rather than up to 12 
months after product launch (e.g. A.III.2, D.I.6 and G.III.4); and indefinite rather than time-
bound commitments to eradicating targeted disease(s) (e.g. F.III.2, F.III.3, Fi.III.4 and 
F.III.5).  Additionally, it would be more strategic to fully recognize negative practices, 
whether anti-competitive or unethical, even when they do not occur in index countries, as 
they reflect a failure of governance systems that the ATMi is attempting to evaluate (e.g. 
B.III.2).  A global perspective to negative practices also recognizes that enforcement might 
only be possible in industrialized countries with stringent drug regulatory authorities, despite 
the possibility of a wider pattern of practice by such companies in miss marketing where 
there might be laxer regulatory standards.  Currently, ethical and legal breaches are only 
recognized in index countries and this has resulted in the exclusion from the 2012 ATMi of 
the criminal misdemeanor charges and USD 3 billion settlement by GSK in the US.35 36 
The ATMi should consider as an alternative, but not necessarily adopt, finalizing and 
publishing its scoring scale in advance of seeking company submissions to provide a clearer 
and more consistent signal of best practices.  The ATMi finalizes the scoring scale for each 
indicator subsequent to the review of submissions by companies in order to seek a balanced 
distribution of performance.  Setting a scoring scale based on the review of company 
submissions could limit the comparability of performance over time, distort the true absolute 
level of performance and provide companies with insufficient signals of best practices to 
strive for.   
The ATMi is encouraged to continue to experiment with indicators that measure outcomes 
and impacts and place less emphasis on outputs to more effectively differentiate 
performance.  For example, currently a number of indicators place a focus on outputs: A.I.2 
rewards the number of outreach activities; A.III.2 the number of reputable conferences 
hosted; C.III.4 the number of product development collaborations; F.III.1 the number of 
training workshops; F.III.2 the number of local public sector research partnerships; and 
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F.III.3 the number of government partnerships.  An important outcome measure as a proxy 
for affordability and availability currently not included in the ATMi is the public disclosure 
of unit sales by drug and country.  This paper acknowledges that unit sales are influenced by 
a number of factors, not all controllable by pharmaceutical companies.  In addition, unit sale 
increases in a country do not guarantee that medicines are reaching the most disadvantaged 
communities.  However, unit sales represent one important data element, which when 
combined with country level needs and funding data, could help to make the impact of 
company access policies more transparent.  An additional outcome measure not included in 
the ATMi relating to in-country perceptions of drug availability, pricing and rational use is 
further discussed in the next section. 
Further standardization would more effectively align measures and simplify the analysis of 
company strengths and weaknesses 
The ATMi should standardize the nature and requirements of indicators to consistently 
measure the adequacy of commitments, transparency and performance in relation to the 
technical activities in scope.  Every theme for each technical area should be associated with a 
measure of commitment, transparency and performance.  For example, indicator D.I.3 
confirms commitments by pharmaceutical companies to control pricing practices of local 
sales agents, however currently this theme is not associated with a measure of transparency 
or performance (refer to Appendix xiv for the analysis of each technical area theme across 
measures of commitment, transparency and performance).  The ATMi should further 
reallocate particular indicators across technical areas to enhance alignment of measures.  For 
example, indicators A.I.2 and A.III.2 relating to engaging with different stakeholder groups 
and further detailed below would be better aligned with capability advancement in product 
development and distribution instead of general access to management.   
A.I.2 The company commits to work with relevant stakeholders including universities, patient groups, local governments, 
employees, local and international NGOs and peers with the aim of improving access to medicines. 
5 The company has a strategy and platform for outreach to >10 relevant stakeholder groups for 3 relevant initiatives. 
4 The company has a strategy and platform for outreach to relevant stakeholder groups for 3 relevant initiatives. 
2.5 The company has a strategy and platform for outreach to relevant stakeholder groups for 2 relevant initiatives. 
1 The company has a strategy and platform for outreach to relevant stakeholder groups for a relevant initiative. 
0 The company has no relevant stakeholder engagement. 
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A.III.2 Senior management participates in public debate and engages with the different stakeholder groups with the goal of 
dialogue and knowledge sharing aimed at improved access to products for the Index Diseases in the Index Countries 
(measured through sponsoring and participating in relevant conferences, workshops, etc.). 
5 The company hosts or plays a significant role to disseminate knowledge (agenda development role/organizing committee/lead 
sponsor) in >15 reputable* conferences/symposia. 
4 The company engages in 5-15 of the above. 
2.5 The company engages in 2-5 of the above. 
1 There is no evidence of more than 1 of the above. 
0 The company does not provide evidence of the above. 
 
 
Indicators B.1.4 and B.II.5 relating to ethical marketing practices and further detailed below 
would be better aligned with manufacturing and distribution instead of public policy and 
market influence.   
B.I.4 The company commits to enforce a code of conduct regarding ethical marketing practices for all sales agents and local 
third party* distributors and contractors consistent with its own internal standards. 
5 The company has processes in place to monitor marketing practices and enforce ethical marketing codes of practice by all its sales 
agents in the relevant countries which includes auditing of the agents’ practices. 
2.5 The company has specific ethical marketing codes of practice for all its sales agents in the relevant countries, but no auditing 
(monitioring or enforcement) mechanisms. 
0 The company makes no provisions with regards to the marketing behaviour of the local sales agents. 
 
B.II.5 The company discloses detailed information regarding its marketing and promotional programmes in the Index 
Countries, such as payments to or promotional activities directed at physicians or other key health care professionals or 
opinion leaders. 
5 The company discloses detailed information related to drug promotion in areas such as payments to physicians and methods for 
incentivising health care providers, pharmacies etc. in the relevant countries. 
2.5 The company discloses its approach without regularly disclosing exact contribution figures and performance information in this 
area (including aggregate data but no details). 
0 The company makes no disclosure in this area. 
 
Indicators C.I.3, C.II.2, and C.III.8 relating to intellectual capital management and further 
detailed below would be better aligned with patents and licensing instead of research and 
development.  
C.I.3 The company commits to ensuring equitable access to products successfully developed through R&D partnerships.  
5 The company systematically applies principles of socially responsible and humanitarian licencing in the relevant countries in 
relation to the intellectual property generated in public private partnerships and PDPs for relevant diseases (i.e. either waives all 
rights over the IP generated or explicitly encourages affordable, timely and high quality supply to relevant populations). 
2.5 The company systematically applies principles of socially responsible and humanitarian licencing in relation to the intellectual 
property generated in public private partnerships and PDPs for a subset of relevant diseases in only a subset of the relevant 
countries.  
0 The company makes no commitments in this area. 
 
C.II.2 The company discloses the licencing details pertaining to its research collaborations related to the Index Diseases (with 
regard to Intellectual Property rights, access provisions etc.). 
5 The company publicly discloses the existence and mandate of all relevant collaborations plus licencing details in relation to the 
duration of engagements, company’s obligations, delivery milestones, march-in clauses and IP rights (such as supply channels, 
territory, disease scope, pricing, delivery timescales, royalties or other payment structures). 
4 The company carries out a full public disclosure of the existence and mandate of the majority of its relevant collaborations plus 
partial licencing details relating to at least one of its collaborations.  
3 The company publicly discloses the existence and mandate of most of its relevant collaborations or provides examples of its 
licencing details. 
2 The company discloses licencing details at 4 or 5 level on an engagement basis only. 
1 The company discloses licencing details at the level of 3 only on an engagement basis only. 
0 The company makes no disclosure in this area. 
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C.III.8 The company provides evidence of sharing its intellectual capital (e.g., molecules library, patented compounds, 
processes or technologies) with research institutions and neglected disease drug discovery initiatives (e.g. WIPO Re: search, 
CDD, OSDD) that develop products for Index Diseases on terms most conducive to access for the Index Countries. 
0-5 Total number of instances of company providing third-party access to its relevant disease-related intellectual property during 
the survey period divided by total company revenue in 2010 and 2011. This number was scaled across all companies to achieve a 
revenue-standardized score. Companies who engaged in intellectual capital sharing received a score between 2.5 and 5. 
Companies who did not provide any evidence of sharing received a 0. 
 
 
More specific and verifiable measures would improve the ability of stakeholders to 
understand and trust the ATMi evaluation framework 
ATMi indicators could be more specific and verifiable to foster greater levels of credibility 
and transparency (refer to Appendix xviii for the results of the evaluation of each 2012 
indicator).  30% of the 101 indicators were considered not adequately specific, as they did 
not always detail what evidence of pharmaceutical companies was to be provided, to whom, 
and how often, as applicable.  Examples of indicators not being specific that are further 
detailed below include B.II.2 (not clear to whom and how often political contributions need 
to be disclosed) and B.II.5 (not clear to whom disclosure is required).   
B.II.2 The company discloses any potential governance conflict of interests and/or interest groups or institutions it financially 
supports, through which it might advocate its public policy positions at regional, national or international levels where 
relevant to access to medicine in the Index Countries. 
5 The company makes detailed transaction level disclosure on lobbying payments to different stakeholders with specific Index 
country reporting. 
4 The company makes detailed transaction level disclosure on lobbying payments to different stakeholders but no specific Index 
country reporting. 
2.5 The company has partial disclosure in this area, supplying aggregate figures only.  
0 The company makes no disclosure in this area. 
 
B.II.5 The company discloses detailed information regarding its marketing and promotional programmes in the Index 
Countries, such as payments to or promotional activities directed at physicians or other key health care professionals or 
opinion leaders. 
5 The company discloses detailed information related to drug promotion in areas such as payments to physicians and methods for 
incentivising health care providers, pharmacies etc. in the relevant countries. 
2.5 The company discloses its approach without regularly disclosing exact contribution figures and performance information in this 
area (including aggregate data but no details). 
0 The company makes no disclosure in this area. 
 
 
55% of indicators did not adequately detail the source and nature of evidence used for 
verification to facilitate independent validation.  Examples of indicators not being verifiable 
that are further detailed below include C.III.2 (not clear what basis was used to calculate 10% 
of pipeline; number in pipeline, investment dollars, etc.) and D.I.6 (not clear what evidence 
was used; whether third party product registry, company internal listing, etc.)   
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C.III.2. Share of research pipeline reflecting ‘new molecules’ for Index Diseases including in-house and collaborative 
research. For companies that have multiple Index disease focus. 
5 Share of pipeline is >10% dedicated to new molecules for relevant diseases. 
4 Share of pipeline has 5-10% dedicated to relevant diseases. 
3 Share of pipeline has <5 % dedicated to relevant diseases or more then 50% with only one or two relevant disease focus. 
2 The company has not provided any molecules in its pipeline for relevant diseases but we have discovered examples of such 
molecules through research of publicly available information. 
0 The company has no molecules/activity with respect to R&D for relevant diseases. 
 
D.I.6 The company commits to file for marketing approval or product registration of its products for the Index Diseases in 
the Index Countries in need. 
5 The company has specific targets to register all products for relevant diseases in all of Sub-Saharan Africa and all other Low-
Income Countries and Low and Middle Income Countries within 12 months of market launch. 
2.5 The company has committed to register a sub-set of its products for relevant diseases in all of Sub-Saharan Africa, Low-Income 
Countries and Low and Middle Income Countries but has not committed to a timeframe. 
0 The company makes no commitment to register its products for the relevant diseases in the relevant countries. 
 
ii. Strengthening the measurement framework in terms of measures, weighting 
and focus would enhance accuracy and completeness of findings 
Additional measures would provide for more complete and accurate measure of 
pharmaceutical performance 
The ATMi should analyze additional measures to more completely and accurately capture the 
performance of pharmaceutical companies (refer to Appendix viii for the pharmaceutical 
sector activities considered important in enhancing access to essential medicines and 
Appendix xvii for the results of the ATMi 2012 indicator evaluation).  One category of 
missing measures relates to the need for companies to disclose more information on current 
practices, such as in relation to ethical promotion complaints, adverse drug reactions, joint 
public private initiative governance transparency and conditions, and donation tax benefits 
derived.  A second category of missing measures relates to the need for higher levels of 
ethical practices, such as not utilizing transfer pricing practices for tax avoidance purposes, 
transparent product labeling and distribution traceability, compliance with international 
manufacturing standards, active drug safety monitoring, responsible patenting of traditional 
medicines and designing packaging to suit local environment conditions and address 
counterfeiting.  A third category of missing measures relates to practices that can accelerate 
the availability, accessibility and affordability of essential medicines, including pricing 
practices that are affordable to the majority of populations in developing countries, 
expanding research into pediatric formulations, not lobbying for stronger intellectual 
property rights in relation to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and seeking drug 
approval in non-US markets prior to approval from the US Food and Drug Administration 
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(FDA) and the EU's European Medicines Agency (EMEA).  As an example, 
GlaxoSmithKline’s launch of Rotarix, a new rotavirus vaccine, in Mexico in 2005 that was 
subsequently approved by the FDA in 2008 and over 100 other countries demonstrates the 
benefit of accelerated approval in non-US markets, however foreign markets must have 
strong drug regulatory bodies to not expose the public to unnecessary risks.37 38  This study 
acknowledges the limitations of being too prescriptive in the definition of indicators, which 
need to also be flexible so that measures remain relevant and comprehensive without the 
need for regular revisions.  Flexibility in indictor definitions, with a focus on intent to 
promote access to essential medicines, would ensure the capture of all relevant activities such 
as Eli Lilly's recent efforts to establish that Canada's denial of one of their patents for an 
attention-deficit disorder drug as valid constitutes a form of takings and warrants USD 100 
million in compensation.39 
Greater consistency in disease and medicine focus would ensure limited resources of ATMi 
are most effectively targeted 
The ATMi understandably limits the scope of diseases, medicines and countries to focus 
attention on areas with the greatest potential for impactful change, however greater 
consistency is required across in-scope and out-of-scope elements to effectively leverage 
resources.  For example, the ATMi includes in its disease scope tetanus and measles for 
which first line prevention includes vaccinations, and treatment includes medicines for 
symptomatic relief; however, vaccines and medicines for symptomatic relief are excluded 
from the index scope.  The ATMi identifies the priority diseases based on an analysis of the 
global DALY burden today.  An alternate analysis of the global disease burden specific to 
LICs and LMICs currently and in 2030 noted some variances, however this study 
acknowledges the subjective nature of selecting diseases in-scope based on a multitude of 
factors evaluated by the ATMi expert stakeholders (refer to Appendix xv for the results of 
the DALY analysis in comparison to the ATMi and Appendix xvi for the projected DALY 
impact in 2030).  Rather than prescribing the diseases or medicines that should be in scope, 
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this study recommends that there should be greater alignment with the in-scope and out-of-
scope elements of the ATMi.  
Strengthening the weighting allocation would place a greater focus on activities important in 
improving access to essential medicines  
The weighting allocation across the ATMi needs to be more reflective of the priorities to 
improving access to essential medicines.  Currently, only 4.0% of the total score for each 
company is attributable to breaches of conduct and litigation in relation to lobbying, 
marketing, bribery, corruption, clinical trials and anti-competitive behavior (indicators 
B.III.1, B.III.2 and C.III.7).  The policy position in terms of TRIPS, data exclusivity and the 
Medicine Patent Pool is apportioned only 3.0% (indicators E.II.1, E.III.5 and B.II.4), 0.5% 
(indicator B.I.3 and B.II.4) and 1.2% (indicator E.III.3) respectively of the total company 
score.  In contrast, non-binding and not necessarily public commitments currently represent a 
quarter (25%) of a company’s entire score, equal to the weighing applied to indicators 
focused on promoting transparency.  Although internal governance structures, codes of 
conduct and policies and procedures are important, a greater weight should be applied to 
transparency and performance reporting, with a greater emphasis on the themes mentioned 
above. 
A greater focus on outcomes would more accurately differentiate company practices 
The analysis of the ATMi would be strengthened by evaluating evidence and incorporating 
studies that focus on the perspectives of people living in developing countries, particularly in 
terms of drug availability, pricing and rational use.  The ATMi analysis currently focuses on 
information submitted by pharmaceutical companies that is verified against third party 
sources.  However, the price set by a pharmaceutical company, quantity shipped to a country 
and recorded sales volumes provide only limited assurance that the final sale price of 
medicines was affordable, accessible and available to disadvantaged communities and 
facilitated rational use.  Surveys of health professionals, patients and community members in 
developing countries, similar to studies conducted by WHO / Health Action International 
Project on Medicine Prices focused on promotional activities and prices, should be 
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performed across a subset of in-scope countries and supplement company evaluations.40  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) represents an example of 
utilizing the perceptions of diverse sources to derive an average absolute score.  This study 
acknowledges the limitations of perception-based indices as observed for the CPI; by 
influencing and being influenced by the perceptions on which they are based through the 
effects of media, perception-based indices may not always reflect reality and may be 
associated with large margins of error.41 
The evaluation criteria of the ATMi needs to be flexible in considering alternative local 
approaches to improving access to essential medicines, rather than prescribing top-down 
global solutions.  For example, the ATMi currently places an emphasis on global tiered 
pricing policies, non-exclusive voluntary licenses and non-assert declarations, but has 
excluded consideration of generic business units of originator companies.  As further detail, 
the ‘Manufacturing and Distribution’ strategic pillar of the ATMi focuses on inter- and intra-
country tiered pricing across all products and relevant countries, but this may not be a viable 
strategy for a company with a generic business unit.  It is acknowledged that generic business 
units were excluded due to a miscommunication between the ATMf and pharmaceutical 
companies as to the in-scope nature of generic drug manufacturers.  Companies should be 
evaluated on their individual approaches to enhancing access to essential medicines based on 
the availability, affordability and accessibility of their relevant product portfolio in index 
countries.    
iii. Greater transparency would strengthen the credibility of results 
ATMi level of disclosure is less than alternative pharmaceutical benchmark studies, 
undermining intention to promote greater transparency   
The ATMi has a number of strengths when compared to alternate benchmark approaches in 
measuring the performance of the pharmaceutical sector, however it is weaker in terms of 
scoring transparency.  An analysis was performed of the methodologies and results of past 
alternative benchmarking exercises in evaluating the pharmaceutical sector in relation to 
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access to essential medicines (refer to Appendix xxxi for the analysis of alternative 
pharmaceutical benchmarking studies related to access to essential medicines).  A limitation 
of the analysis performed was that most alternate indices only included access to essential 
medicines as a sub component of the larger environmental and social governance framework.  
The ATMi was noted to be comparatively stronger in terms of its holistic approach to 
assessing access to essential medicines, free availability to public, evaluation of both public 
and sensitive private information, transparent scoring methodology, regular frequency and 
engagement of external non-pharmaceutical company stakeholders in the development of the 
scoring methodology.  However, the ATMi was noted to be comparatively weaker in terms 
of the disclosure by not detailing indicator level scores, with three benchmarking studies 
providing full scoring transparency.  Greater transparency would help to bolster the 
credibility and accuracy of the ATMi.      
Greater disclosure would facilitate more alignment with alternate third party measures of 
performance to enhance credibility 
The ATMi needs to detail indicator level scores to enable a comparison and the validation of 
company performance with third party measures.  For example, the ATMi findings are not 
consistent with the 2012 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Accountability and 
Disclosure and the Center for Responsive Politics 2012 lobbying spend, despite an 
overlapping focus on the disclosure and governance of lobbying spend.  CPA-Zicklin index 
notes that the most transparent pharmaceutical companies were Merck & Co, Gilead 
Sciences and Johnson and Johnson, while the ATMi recognized GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi 
and Novo Nordisk A/S as the leaders in terms of transparency.  The Center for Responsive 
Politics noted in 2012 that the pharmaceutical sector lobbying spend was USD 232 million in 
the US, with the top lobbyists being Eli Lilly & Co, Pfizer Inc, Merck & Co. and Novartis 
(refer to Appendix xxxii for the 2012 pharmaceutical industry lobbying profile).42  The 
Center for Responsive Politics further notes that Pfizer’s lobbying activities included a focus 
on intellectual property protections in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, U.S. 
intellectual property rights overseas; issues relating to an Indian Supreme Court decision on 
generic medicine pricing and issues relating to cancellation of patent in India and medicines 
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in Turkey.43  Additional lobbying activities noted included Merck on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement and biologic data exclusivity, Eli Lilly & Co on international 
property protection and international market access issues and Novartis A/G on free trade 
agreements related to intellectual property provisions in Panama, Colombia, Korea Access, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, global influenza pandemic and substandard medicine quality.44  
The ATMi noted the best performers in terms of public policy as Sanofi, Bristol-Myers Squib 
Co and Novartis, with Eli Lilly & Co equally placed with other companies including Merck 
& Co. for third, and narrowly above Pfizer.   
Disaggregated indicator ratings are necessary for stakeholders to analyze and validate 
findings from different vantage points of accountability  
ATMi ratings should be disaggregated to the indicator level to enable different stakeholders 
to evaluate and validate absolute performance level against alternative perspectives of 
industry accountability.  The ATMi publicly disaggregates rankings only to the strategic and 
technical area level, limiting the ability of different stakeholders to understand and validate 
absolute performance levels.  The ATMf does share with pharmaceutical companies their 
absolute scores for select indicators upon request.  An analysis of changes in the rating of 
each company between 2010 and 2012 could not always be explained by individual company 
activities as reported by ATMi; an inherent limitation of focusing on relative performance 
where rating changes can be attributed to competitor actions  (refer to Appendix xxx for the 
analysis of changes in company performance from 2010 to 2012).  The Aid Transparency 
Index is a good representative model of transparency, publishing not only its results by 
organization and indicator, but also the evidence used, comments on evidence and outcomes 
of the peer review.  The University Global Health Impact Report Card is another good model 
of disaggregated reporting.  Disaggregated indicator information should be supported by 
evidence gathered, when not subject to confidentiality restrictions.  
Lack of absolute performance transparency can erode the perceived credibility of the ATMi 
by not allowing independent validation (refer to Appendix xxxiii, xxxiv and xxxv for an 
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independent analysis of Gilead Sciences, Sanofi and Novo Nordisk product portfolio and 
research pipeline).  The ATMi does not facilitate an analysis by product of each company’s 
relevant patent policies, registration, tiered pricing, non-exclusive voluntary licenses, sales 
and donations segmented by country, which can result in skewed reporting.  For example, the 
ATMi only acknowledged the positive contributions by Gilead for Viread and Truvada in 
terms of HIV/AIDS drugs, not referencing three other relevant drugs, Atripla, Emtriva and 
Stribild, one of which Gilead was also making more accessible.  As a result, the ATMi fails 
to draw attention to activities related to medicines on the WHO EML that fall outside of the 
index disease scope but are still important to monitor, such as Gilead’s Tamiflu (influenza), 
Sanofi’s wide range of vaccines and Taxoterne (oncology) and Novo Nordisk’s NovoSeven 
(hemophilia).  The ATMi also does not facilitate a reconciliation of each company’s product 
portfolio and research pipeline to the diseases in scope, which can result in reporting 
inconsistencies.  For example, Gilead was noted as conducting research in relation to 
Hepatitis C, Hepatitis B, Liver Fibrosis and Type 2 Diabetes, the first three indirectly related 
to in-scope diseases and the last an in-scope disease, however none were acknowledged by 
the ATMi.  Sanofi was noted as conducting research in Tetanus and Hepatitis B and had 
products for Lymphatic Filariasis, Trypanosomiasis and Osteoarthritis, all in-scope diseases 
not acknowledged by the ATMi.  Additionally, Sanofi was given credit for products related 
to low respiratory infections, malaria, tuberculosis, pertussis, cerebroacular disease, 
osteoarthritis, and leishmaniasis, and research related to diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, 
ischaemic heart disese, cerebrovacular disease, COPD, leishmaniasis and trypanosomiasis 
which was not able to be reconciled to Sanofi’s product and research pipeline on their 
website.    
iv. Greater disclosure and analytical tools would more effectively inform 
stakeholders 
More complete and detailed disclosure of company information would make the ATMi a 
more trusted and complete measure of industry performance 
Although the ATMi focuses on publishing positive contributions by pharmaceutical 
companies in order to encourage leadership by example, more detailed and complete 
coverage is required of activities that limit access to essential medicines.  An analysis was 
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performed utilizing Factiva, Lexis / Nexis, ABI / Inform Complete, Business Source 
Complete and Global Socrates - Corporate Social Responsibility to identify key access to 
essential medicine issues not adequately addressed by ATMi.  The ATMi was noted not to 
have addressed the global advocacy campaign in 12 countries to challenge Abbott 
Laboratories’ monopolistic hold on Kaletra (lopinavir+ritonavir), considered a key part of 
HIV/AIDS treatment regimens.45  An administrative judge in Colombia ruled in 2012 that 
Abbott improperly maintained the price of the Kaletra AIDS medication above the so-called 
reference price.46  The ATMi did not note in 2012 that Abbott Laboratories had filed a 
citizen’s petition with the Food & Drug Administration asking the agency not to approve any 
biosimilar for its Humira treatment for rheumatoid arthritis, which has the potential to restrict 
product innovations.47  Although the ATMi did acknowledge the potential negative 
implications of legal cases relating to patentability criteria (Novartis) and compulsory 
licensing (Bayer), the Gilvec and Nexavar cases respectively were mentioned only 
summarily in one combined sentence, not reflective of their significance.48  The ATMi was 
also noted not to have addressed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which the 
pharmaceutical industry is utilizing to enforce stronger copyright, patent protection, and data 
exclusivity.49 
ATMi reporting of company performance by technical area and company report cards needs 
to provide more depth, balance and context.  The ATMi only reports on activities in the two-
year period under evaluation, often providing limited contextual information and depth.  
Information not always detailed includes when initiatives are started and their related 
activities and partners, and the full product and research pipeline and related access policies.  
Further, the one to two page company report cards at the end of the ATMi report don’t 
provide a balanced representation of absolute performance.  For example, litigation and 
ethical breaches are often entirely excluded from the summary report cards, such as for 
instance the 2011 Securities and Exchange Commission charge of Johnson & Johnson in 
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relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme and AstraZenca’s 28 marketing and sales 
breaches.  The information communicated in the company scorecards is particularly 
important as they represent the only consolidated summary of absolute performance 
generated by the ATMi, with the information contained replicated on the ATMi website.  The 
company report cards need to be more representative of each company’s absolute 
performance for each technical area evaluated.  The ATMi should additionally maintain a 
complete, time scaled repository of the activities of index companies on its website, with 
supporting links to more in-depth information where publicly available.   
Visualization and data analysis tools would enhance ability to evaluate performance over 
time across different criteria 
The ATMf needs to provide visualization and data analysis tools to facilitate the analysis and 
comparison of company performance over time.  The diversity of stakeholders the ATMi is 
servicing necessitates the ability for information to be screened based on alternate 
accountability criteria.  All information detailed by the ATMf is currently in a static and text 
form, other than graphical representations of technical and strategic level scores.  There is no 
ability to use tools to compare information, over time, across regions or diseases.  The ATMf 
should provide analytical and data visualization tools in a format that enhances 
understanding, simplifies and standardizes information and empowers greater analysis.  For 
example, a graphical map that displays the products and initiatives of companies individually 
and in aggregate in different countries by disease could be helpful to compare to disease 
incidence over time.  A tool that analyzes the research and development product pipeline 
across companies and highlights potential gaps in response to future disease incidence could 
be important in fuelling public debate.  Another important contribution could be a filtering 
tool that allows the public to quickly analyze product portfolios to identify essential 
medicines and understand the related accessibility policies of companies.  The Carbon 
Disclosure Project illustrates the potential of advanced analytics to both empower users and 
generate earned revenue by being able to search for information using various modifiable 
criteria.  The Corruption Perception Index demonstrates the potential of infographics to 
enhance the delivery of messages and facilitate customized queries. 
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More frequent reporting would deliver more relevant and accurate information 
The rapid developments across the pharmaceutical sector require frequent reporting to 
provide relevant and accurate information to users.  The ATMi currently publishes an 
industry index every two years and does not otherwise report on developments across the 
industry.  Index scores published every two years can quickly become obsolete.  For 
example, the 2010 ATMi scored Johnson & Johnson positively for entering negotiations with 
the Medicine Patent Pool, however by December 2011 Johnson & Johnson had withdrawn 
from the negotiations.  More frequent updates would ensure the index scoring was reflective 
of current practices.  The ATMi should regularly report updates on its website relating to 
index companies to draw attention to key developments relating to access to essential 
medicines.  For example, the ATMi could have drawn attention to the recent launch by Eli 
Lilly & Co of a legal challenge under the North American Free Trade Agreement demanding 
USD 100 million in compensation for the Canadian court decision striking a patent for an 
attention-deficit disorder drug.50 
v. Additional distinct measures would enhance insight on access to essential 
medicines bottlenecks 
Gap in access to generic drugs needs greater attention to improve access to essential 
medicines 
A complementary and distinct measure is required to provide insight on the affordability and 
availability of generic drugs.  The challenges of access to generic drugs are distinct from 
branded products and need to be accordingly reflected in a unique evaluation framework.  
Rather than placing a focus on generic companies, a complementary index should rank 
individual generic products or categories in terms of the level of competition that exists, to 
ensure generic drugs are available, cheap and of sufficient quality.  
The ATMi commenced in 2008 by evaluating generic manufacturers and originator 
pharmaceutical companies under the same evaluation framework.  In 2010, the ATMi 
evaluated originator pharmaceutical companies and generic manufactures under two different 
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frameworks, however after further stakeholder consultations generic manufacturers were 
entirely excluded in 2012.  We understand that the exclusion was attributed to the need for 
more specific measurement standards specific to the generic manufacturing industry, which 
the ATMf is exploring for potential inclusion in 2014. 51   
Generic drugs and manufacturers represent the core component of access to essential 
medicines.  Over 90% of the medicines on the WHO EML are generic drugs currently 
excluded by the ATMi; one-third of the population of the developing world is unable to 
receive or purchase essential medicines on a regular basis.52  Average public sector 
availability of generic medicines across WHO regions is 29.4%-54.4%.53  The global 
generics market represented 75% of the total pharmaceutical volume in 2011 and is expected 
to rise to 85% by 2016.54  The boundary between generic manufacturers and originator 
pharmaceutical companies is eroding over time, with Sandoz representing the generic 
pharmaceutical division of Novartis and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd moving into 
branded medicines following the purchase of Hutexil in 2013. 
Contributions of distributors, biotechnology companies, and small and medium sized 
enterprises to access to essential medicines needs to be monitored 
Distribution companies, biotechnology companies, and small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME) represent important industry stakeholders in increasing access to essential medicines 
that need to be continuously monitored (refer to Appendix vi for further details on the 
composition of the global pharmaceutical sector).  Monitoring is necessary to encourage 
positive contributions and discourage activities that limit access to essential medicines.  
Rather than developing a separate index, the ATMf should focus on attracting greater 
attention to industry activities that positively or negatively impact access to essential 
medicines, by publishing industry updates on its website. 
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Distribution companies, biotechnology companies, and SMEs will continue to play an 
important role in enhancing access to essential medicines.  Cumulative markups in low- and 
middle-income countries by wholesalers, importers and retailers can range from 17-84% in 
the public sector and 11%-6,894% in the private sector.55  Global out-of-country distributors 
or bulk purchasers / procurement agencies currently only offer their services to vertical 
programs like the Global Fund, but may in the future offer their services to country supply 
chain managers.  By 2016, the global biotechnology market is estimated to equal half the 
value of the global drug pharmaceutical market.56  SMEs accounted in 2005 for half of all 
identified neglected disease drug projects and in 2011 for 10.6% of total industry funding in 
neglected diseases.57  Further, small companies such as Royalty Pharma that acquire patent 
rights to biopharmaceutical products may in the future limit access to essential medicines.  
SMEs in developing or emerging markets are likely to play a larger role in serving the needs 
of access to medicines in developing countries.  A leading biotechnology company and SME 
includes Anacor and Humax Pharmaceutical, both part of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative, and two leading global distributors include IDA and I+ Solutions. 
Suboptimal government policies need greater focus to improve access to essential medicines  
An additional index needs to be developed that evaluates the infrastructure, policies and 
distribution network of each country in terms of access to essential medicines.  The 2006 
Global Corruption Report on the health sector of Transparency International and the 
Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA) reflect a growing focus on governance at the 
country level.58  Governance of essential medicines at the country level should include a 
focus on national anti-corruption efforts, medicine regulations (including discriminatory laws 
based on race, gender, health status, etc.), regulatory authorities, medicines registration, 
licensing of pharmaceutical establishments, inspection and market control, medicine 
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promotion control, clinical trials of medicines, selection of medicines, procurement of 
medical products, and distribution of medicines.59   
As different countries will have different starting points on any prescribed measures, the 
important measures need to include actionable indicators that go beyond pointing out obvious 
disparities rooted in socio-economic differences.  Examples of specific measures that could 
motivate the reallocation of resources or greater dedication of efforts include: tariff barriers 
on malaria bed nets in contradiction of the Arusha Declaration commitments; successful 
performance on grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; 
average availability of selected medicines in public and private health facilities; percentage 
of the population covered by health insurance; existence of legal provisions to encourage 
generic substitution; and taxes and duties on essential medicines.60  This study acknowledges 
that certain transparency measures at the national level, such as in relation to research and 
development tax credits by product, may complicate efforts of securing greater collaboration 
from multi-national corporations for the ATMi, however overall it should contribute to 
enhanced access to essential medicines. 
Country governance represents a significant barrier to access to essential medicines and 
requires greater transparency and standardization of environments.  A study of 36 low- and 
middle-income countries noted that public and private sector facilities only had essential 
medicines in stock one third and two thirds of the time respectively.61  Per 10,000 people in 
Brazil, India and China there are only 12, 6 and 14 doctors respectively.62  Investment by 
national governments in the health-care sector, particularly across Africa, has remained low, 
with national budgets decreasing for general essential medicines and general health and 
supply systems.63  As of 2011, 50 countries have not updated their list of essential medicines 
to guide public supply or reimbursement.64  WHO estimates that in many countries up to half 
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of all prescriptions are either unnecessary or incorrect and that in about half of all cases 
patients do not take their medications as prescribed.65 
g. Study limitations 
Limited Stakeholder Participation 
This study attempted to sample a range of perspectives across the pharmaceutical sector, 
investor groups, global health organizations and human rights organizations, however the 
responses received, while valuable, cannot be considered representative (refer to Section K 
for a full listing of participants).  Greater public dialogue is encouraged concerning efforts to 
measure the performance of the pharmaceutical sector in terms of access to essential 
medicines. 
Lack of Access to Information 
The ATMi is able to evaluate a wide breadth of performance standards by obtaining access to 
sensitive and confidential information, however the resulting lack of transparency of 
activities and scores limited the ability of this study to benchmark results and findings.  
Greater levels of transparency across the pharmaceutical sector and the ATMi are encouraged 
to promote a more inclusive dialogue on the performance standards across the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
h. Areas for further study 
Importance of Avoiding the Light Under the Lamp Post Syndrome 
Access to essential medicines is not only relevant to the disease, country and product scope 
of the ATMi, therefore care needs to be taken that the focus of the ATMi does not detract 
from activities in other important areas.  Examples were noted of medicines on the WHO 
EML that fall outside of the index disease scope, such as Gilead’s Tamiflu (influenza), 
Sanofi’s wide range of vaccines and Taxoterne (oncology) and Novo Nordisk’s NovoSeven 
(hemophilia) for which access policies are still important.  Additionally, the ATMi does not 
include in its scope countries with high level of internal income disparities, such as Columbia 
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(10th worst in world), Chile (15th), Brazil (16th), Mexico (18th) and Russia (51st).66  The 
Human Development Report 2006 noted wide disparities in the HDI rankings of the richest 
and poorest 20% of populations through a disaggregated study of 13 developing countries.     
The ATMi could limit public attention on other important aspects of promoting access to 
essential medicines if it was to play a more dominant role in setting the public agenda.  It is 
understandable that the ATMi limits its scope to enable its limited resources to provide a 
sufficient depth of analysis.  However, it is also important that pharmaceutical companies are 
encouraged to proactively make access to all their medicines in terms of diagnosis, treatment 
and prevention, particularly medicines listed on the WHO EML, available to all 
disadvantaged communities.  Close monitoring is required to ensure that companies do not 
only focus on the scope of the ATMi in providing access to essential medicines and that out-
of-scope activities that contribute or detract from access to essential medicines are 
appropriately recognized.  The ATMi may consider acknowledging on its website, but not 
scoring, out of scope activities that contribute to access to essential medicines. 
Need for Focus on Link Between Barrier, Strategy and Specific Action 
Analyzing access to essential medicines globally based on the role of one actor can neglect to 
place a sufficient focus on the specific and unique challenges of individual drugs and regions.  
Global initiatives should be supplemented by in-depth case studies to maintain a focus on the 
key supply-chain bottlenecks.  Frost & Reich promote an evaluation framework focused on 
architecture (organizational dimension), availability (supply component; manufacturing, 
forecasting, procurement, distribution and delivery), affordability (cost component; 
government affordability, non-governmental agency affordability and end-user affordability) 
and adoption (demand component; global adoption, national adoption, provider adoption and 
end-user adoption and appropriate use) that integrates all actors.67  “A deeper understanding 
of the facilitators, barriers, and key actors involved in achieving architecture, availability, 
affordability, and adoption is necessary for better access planning.”68  Case studies need to 
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support the ATMi in-scope disease focus to ensure that global attention is being placed on 
the key barriers that will most significantly improve access to essential medicines.  
Greater Emphasis Required on Outcomes 
More case studies are required to demonstrate alternative approaches to measuring outcomes 
objectively.  The pharmaceutical sector depends more on outputs in terms of the number of 
drugs delivered, number of countries reached and value of donations as examples to 
demonstrate impact.  Impact needs to focus on measuring the ability of disadvantaged 
communities to have access to, afford and rationally use essential medicines.  Collaborative 
studies as part of public-private partnerships should be considered to evaluate the impact of 
pharmaceutical initiatives on the lives of the disadvantaged.  Case studies measuring impact 
add to the credibility of activities by the pharmaceutical sector and center attention on the 
people that do not have adequate access to essential medicines. 
Need for Standardized and Public Measures of Pharmaceutical Company Performance 
A comprehensive and standardized reporting framework is required for the pharmaceutical 
sector to enhance transparency and reduce the reporting burden regarding social, 
environmental and governance activities, particularly in relation to access to essential 
medicines.  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides general corporate responsibility 
guidelines that have been adopted by a number of pharmaceutical companies including 
Novartis, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer and Bayer.  However, GRI does not provide 
pharmaceutical sector-specific guidelines, an initiative advocated for by Novartis.69  A study 
should be conducted to identify the reporting framework and terms and definitions that 
optimally balance the information needs of different stakeholder groups.  Greater 
standardization of information reported by the pharmaceutical sector would enhance the 
ability to benchmark performance and reduce the reporting burden to such transparency 
initiatives as the ATMi. 
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Challenge of Identifying Optimal Versus Actual Contribution 
In determining the optimal level of contributions of companies, a greater understanding is 
required of the value offerings of each company.  In 2005, five of the top 12 multinational 
pharmaceutical companies did not conduct neglected disease drug research and development, 
and in 2012 this represented half of all companies in the ATMi based on the in-scope 
neglected tropical diseases.70  In 2005, the multinational companies that left the neglected 
disease field made it clear that commercial incentives or good public relations would not be 
sufficient to change their neglected disease focus.71  This can be attributed to companies 
focusing on a small number of commercially rewarding therapeutic areas and cutting lose 
non-core disease areas including infections diseases and veterinary divisions.72  Further study 
is required on ways to identify the value each company can optimally contribute in terms of 
knowledge, expertise and resources in comparison to actual performance.  As an example, 
the commitment by Gilead Sciences to donate 455,000 vials of AmBisome during 2012-2017 
to treat 50,000 people, could be weighed in context of its USD 8 non-profit value and the fact 
that 12 million people world-wide are affected by visceral leishmaniasis.73   
Analyzing the Value of a Proactive Response to Access to Essential Medicines 
A focus needs to be made on measuring the commercial benefits to companies of proactively 
responding to the challenge of access to essential medicines.  In 2004, the Pharmaceutical 
Shareowners Group, an international grouping of 14 institutional investors with significant 
exposure to the pharmaceutical sector, noted a number of risks stemming from the public 
health crises in emerging markets on the long-term shareholder value of the pharmaceutical 
sector.74  Attempts should be made to objectively measure benefits arising from proactive 
access to essential medicines approaches in terms of the preservation of suitable intellectual 
property laws and patent treaties, protection of company reputation and license to operate, 
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political goodwill to secure future markets, improved stakeholder relations and enhanced 
employee morale and recruitment prospects.75   
Completeness of Essential Medicines List 
The WHO EML has been used as the primary basis for identifying drugs that pharmaceutical 
companies should be making more accessible to disadvantaged communities.  Continued 
studies are necessary to ensure that the optimal and best in class medicines to diagnose, 
prevent and treat key diseases are included in the WHO EML.  Oncology represents one area 
of continued concern in terms of high prices based on interviews and surveys conducted.   
i. Conclusion 
Actionable governance indicators (AGI) represent important mechanisms in promoting 
industry sector change.  The success of AGIs is dependent on their capacity to maximize the 
transparency of practices and empower multi-stakeholder collaboration and dialogue.  The 
ATMi is a recently developed AGI that has in six years helped to shape certain industry 
practices in relation to access to essential medicines.  The ATMf has established a new 
precedent for objectively evaluating access to essential medicines across the pharmaceutical 
sector by accessing sensitive information and engaging in an open dialogue with diverse 
stakeholders.   
The ATMi needs to continue to build on its achievements in order to promote further 
meaningful change across the pharmaceutical sector.  A key challenge for the index will be to 
enhance its engagement with different stakeholder groups in order for pharmaceutical 
companies to perceive greater benefits to costs in improving their performance. 
This paper identifies a number of opportunities for the ATMf to enhance its engagement with 
its diverse stakeholders.  If the ATMf fully adopts the values it desires to encourage across 
the pharmaceutical sector, by being more objective, transparent, accountable and 
collaborative, it should continue to comprise an important lever in promoting positive 
industry change. 
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j. Appendix 
i. Factors limiting access to essential medicines 
 High cost:  Spending on pharmaceuticals as a proportion of total public and private health 
for developed, transitional and developing economies is 20%, 15-30% and 25-66% 
respectively.76  Across 33 countries, the lowest-priced generic medicines in the private 
sector were observed to be more than double the prices in the public sector, with price 
differentials being greater for branded products.77   
 Inefficient distribution: Medicine prices consist of manufacturer costs, duties, taxes and 
markups.  Cumulative markups in low- and middle-income countries by wholesalers, 
importers and retailers can range from 17-84% in the public sector and 11%-6,894% in 
the private sector, though in many countries the manufacturer’s selling price is the major 
contributor to the final price.78  In low- and middle-income countries private sector 
patients paid 9-25 times international reference prices for lowest-priced generic products 
and over 20 times international reference prices for originator products.79  A 2003 study 
by BUKO of over 2,500 drugs exported by Germany to forty-six countries noted that 
39% were irrational (i.e. ineffective or damaging) and that significantly more time was 
required to remove drugs from developing countries in response to safety concerns as 
compared to Germany.80   
 Limited health infrastructure: A study of 36 low- and middle-income countries noted that 
public and private sector facilities only had essential medicines in stock one third and two 
thirds of the time respectively.81  Average public sector availability of generic medicines 
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across WHO regions is 29.4%-54.4%.82  Per 10,000 people in Brazil, India and China 
there are only 12, 6 and 14 doctors respectively.83 
 Limited health financing:  Investment by national governments in the health-care sector, 
particularly across Africa, has remained low, with national budgets decreasing for general 
essential medicines and general health and supply systems.84 
 Narrow disease focus: The selective approach of focusing on priority diseases is resulting 
in the neglect of other important developing country conditions such as chronic diseases 
and common diseases in children.85  In low- and lower-middle income countries, drugs 
for chronic conditions were 33.9% and 12.9% less available in the public sector than 
medicines for acute conditions, with a narrower gap observed in the private sector.86 
 Inequitable health financing mechanisms: Up to 90% of households in developing 
countries with relatively limited purchasing power are responsible for the cost of essential 
medicines.87  In low-income countries without effective public healthcare systems, 
medicines can account for 50-90% of household out of pocket expenditure on health.88  A 
survey across 16 low- and middle-income countries noted that 86% of the population 
would be pushed into poverty by purchasing one of four medicines based on median 
patient prices.89       
 Limited R&D pipeline: Approximately 10% of the global pharmaceutical research and 
development expenditure goes towards diseases that account for 90% of the world’s 
disease burden.90  In 2010 $3.1 billion research and development was reported for Type II 
and Type III neglected diseases, reflecting a 3.5% fall from 2009 and representing 4.6% 
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of the total global R&D spend of $67.4 billion in 2010.91 92  Cumulative funding for 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria in 2010 represented 71.7% of all Type II and Type III 
infectious disease funding.93     
 Lack of data and coordination: Information systems supporting medical supply chains 
are weak, making performance monitoring and efficiency evaluations challenging.94  The 
many different partners with their specific medicines supply strategy has limited global 
coordination, resulting in duplication and inefficiency.95  As of 2011, 50 countries have 
not updated their list of essential medicines to guide public supply or reimbursement.96   
 Limited quality controls: In August 2012 China detained approximately 2,000 people and 
seized $182 million in fake medicine, including fraudulent drugs for the treatment of 
cancer, hypertension and diabetes.97  A meta-analysis of anti-malarial drug studies in 
seven countries in South East Asia noted 35% failed chemical analysis, 46% failed 
packaging analysis and 36% were classified as falsified, with the respective findings for 
21 sub-Saharan Africa countries being 35%, 36% and 20%.98  A 2005 study of the top 25 
selling brands of medicines in India noted that ten were irrational, non-essential or 
hazardous.99     
 Ineffective practices: WHO estimates that in many countries up to half of all 
prescriptions are either unnecessary or incorrect and that in about half of all cases patients 
do not take their medications as prescribed.100 
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ii. Definition of Type I, II and III diseases  
“Type I diseases are incident in both rich and poor countries, with large numbers of 
vulnerable population in each. Examples of communicable diseases include measles, 
hepatitis B, and Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), and examples of noncommunicable 
diseases abound (e.g., diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and tobacco-related illnesses).  In 
the case of Type I diseases, the incentives for R&D exist in the rich country 
markets…Products get developed, and the main policy issue, visà-vis the poor countries, is 
access to those technologies, which tend to be high priced and under patent protection…Type 
II diseases are incident in both rich and poor countries, but with a substantial proportion of 
the cases in the poor countries. R&D incentives exist in the rich country markets, therefore, 
but the level of R&D spending on a global basis is not commensurate with disease burden. 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis are examples: both diseases are present in both rich and poor 
countries, but more than 90 percent of cases are in the poor countries. In the case of vaccines 
for HIV/AIDS, substantial R&D is underway as a result of rich country market demand, but 
not in proportion to global need or addressed to the specific disease conditions of the poor 
countries. In the case of TB the situation is even worse, with very little R&D underway for 
new and better treatment. Type III diseases are those that are overwhelmingly or exclusively 
incident in the developing countries, such as African sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) and 
African river blindness (onchocerciasis). Such diseases receive extremely little R&D, and 
essentially no commercially based R&D in the rich countries. When new technologies are 
developed, they are usually serendipitous, as when a veterinary medicine developed by 
Merck (ivermectin) proved to be effective in control of onchocerciasis in humans.”101 
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iii. Analysis of global burden of disease statistics 
An analysis of the World Health Organization (WHO) global burden of disease statistics 
published in 2004 and updated in 2008 indicates 1.13 billion DALYs were lost due to 
communicable and non-communicable diseases.  82.1% of the total global disease burden 
was attributed to low-middle and low-income countries that represent 75.8% of the world’s 
population. 
Non-communicable diseases represent the predominate cause of DALYs lost globally, 
however communicable diseases represent the largest DALY impact in low-income 
countries.  If the population age distribution were controlled for, non-communicable disease 
risks would be higher in low- and middle- income countries than in high-income countries.102  
Children less than 15 years of age were attributed to half of the disease burden in low-income 
countries, despite representing only 37% of the population.103  
Figure 2: 2004 (Updated 2008) Global Burden of Disease  
 
Source data: WHO 2004 (updated 2008) Summary: DALYs (000s) by cause and income group 
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An analysis of the non-communicable diseases reveals similar incidence rates across low-, 
lower-middle-, upper-middle-, and high-income countries, with the five largest disease 
burdens represented by neuropsychiatric disorders, cardiovascular disease, sense organ 
disorders, malignant neoplasms and respiratory diseases (refer to Appendix v for the disease 
incidence rates).  An analysis of communicable diseases reveals that over 85% of the burden 
in high- and upper-middle income countries can be attributed to HIV/AIDS, lower 
respiratory infections, tuberculosis and diarrheal diseases.  In lower-middle income and low-
income countries 85% of the communicable disease burden can be attributed to lower 
respiratory infections, diarrheal disease, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and childhood 
diseases.  Communicable disease burden represents a significant unfinished agenda in low-
income countries (even compared to lower-middle-income countries).   
Figure 3: 2004 (Updated 2008) Communicable Disease Incidence by Income   
 
Source data: WHO 2004 (updated 2008) Summary: DALYs (000s) by cause and income group 
In 2030, global DALYs are predicted to decrease by approximately 10% due to assumed 
increases in overall living standards.104  It is projected that non-communicable diseases will 
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represent 66% of the total DALY’s lost.105  The three leading causes of DALY’s globally are 
anticipated to be unipolar depressive disorders, ischaemic heart disease and road traffic 
accidents.106  
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iv. International human rights legal framework 
The international legal framework surrounding the right to health continues to evolve at the 
state level through progressive accountability measures.  Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 recognizes the right to medical care and medicines in 
promoting health and well-being.  Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1976 recognizes the right to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.  In 2000 the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued General Comment 14 that requires states to take 
deliberate steps towards the full realization of the right to health, including the provision of 
essential drugs and immunizations.   
The challenge however remains in applying universal human right ideals in light of diverse 
cultural values and limited state resources.107  Over 30 countries have not ratified ICESCR 
and 60 countries do not recognize the right to health in their national constitution.108 
“…many governments, including that of the United States do little to redress inequalities in 
health, while others are largely powerless to address such inequity.  The reasons for failure are 
many and varied, but even optimists allow that human rights charters and covenants have not 
brought an end to – and may not even have slowed – egregious abuses, however they are 
defined.“109 
CESCR General Comment 14 notes that the private business sector has responsibilities 
regarding the realization of the right to health.  In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion of Human Rights approved a set of norms on the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations that included contributing to the realization of rights to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.  In 2011 the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework that specified: the state obligation to protect 
against corporate-related human rights abuse, the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, and access to effective remedy. 
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The Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to 
Medicines of 2008 promulgated by the United Nations Human Rights Council provide sector 
specific guidance in promoting access to medicine.110  The guidelines require pharmaceutical 
companies to recognize the right to the highest attainable standard of health, particularly of 
the disadvantaged.  The recommendations included, but were not limited to, transparent 
reporting, standardized disclosure, independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 
ethical practices and an increased focus on research and development for neglected diseases. 
In 2009, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health visited the headquarters of GSK, a 
company regarded as one of the leading exponents of corporate social responsibility in the 
pharmaceutical sector.111  The Special Rapporteur made clear in his report that 
pharmaceutical companies have right-to-health responsibilities that exceed the ethical and 
legal requirements implicit in shareholder primacy, a position that GSK rejected.112  This 
paper acknowledges the leading role of Andrew Witty, Chief Executive Officer, GSK in 
supporting global access to medicines and in lowering the costs of research and development 
to bridge the gulf in bringing needed treatments to market. 
“A member of the senior management of an innovator pharmaceutical company recently 
remarked…that the company’s patents were “its crown jewels”.  The image was revealing.  In 
one sense, the image is legitimate - patents are immensely valuable.  In another sense, the 
image reflects a profound misunderstanding of the role of a company that develops a life-
saving medicine…such a company has performed a critically important social, medical, public 
health and right-to-health function.  While the company’s “reward” is the grant of a limited 
monopoly over the medicine, enabling it to enhance shareholder value and invest in further 
research and development, the company also has a right-to-health responsibility to take all 
reasonable steps to make the life-saving medicine as accessible as possible, as soon as possible, 
to all those in need.  For a limited period, the company holds the patent for society - but the 
patent must be worked, so far as possible, for the benefit of all those who need it.”113 
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v. DALYs (‘000s) by cause and income group (3% discounting, Age weights) 
 
Source data: WHO 2004 (updated 2008) Summary: DALYs (000s) by cause and income group 
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vi. Analysis of pharmaceutical industry and segments 
The global pharmaceutical industry in 2010/11 was valued at $1,589.2 billion and can be 
segmented across drug pharmaceuticals, over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceuticals, generics, 
biotechnology, life sciences tools and services and distribution.  Drug pharmaceuticals 
include in-patient and outpatient ethical drugs.  OTC pharmaceuticals include traditional 
medicines, vitamins, analgesics and topical products.  Generics include branded and 
unbranded copies of off-patent ethical prescription drugs, excluding off-patent drugs offered 
by original manufacturers under the original name.  Biotechnology includes 
medical/healthcare, service provider, food & agriculture, technology service, and 
environment and industrial processing.  Life sciences tools and services include clinical and 
non-clinical contract research services servicing pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies.  Distribution includes pharmaceutical and medical supplies.  For the purposes of 
this paper OTC pharmaceuticals, life sciences tools and services and distribution will not be 
further considered as they are not directly related to the provision of essential medicines by 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Figure 4: Global Pharmaceutical Industry Value 2010/11 ($’billion) 
 
Source data: Marketline 2012 - Note: Distribution and OTC represent 2010 market values while remaining segments 
represent 2011 market values.   
 
 
$797.7
$137.2
$187.2
$289.1
$20.3 $157.7 Drug
OTC
Generics
Biotechnology
Life	Sciences
Distribution
  57
The overall pharmaceutical industry can be summarized as being in a consolidation phase.  In 
2011, 504 merger and acquisition deals took place to the value of $90 billion.114  The merger 
activity has been accompanied by significant reductions in staff; since 2007 Pfizer, Merck 
and AstraZeneca have reduced their workforce by over 20,000 and Bayer, J&J and GSK by 
over 10,000.115  The challenges associated with the expiration of valuable patents have been 
compounded by lower drug approval rates of new molecular entities and biologics and lower 
financial returns for each new drug developed associated with less drug blockbusters being 
identified.116  Increasingly, in-house commercial R&D is moving to a modular R&D 
approach with intellectual property being directly licensed or acquired from candidate-rich 
but cash-poor biotechs, small companies and academics.117  Non-core R&D activities 
continue to be outsourced to contract research organizations (CRO), particularly in India and 
China.118  Emerging economies continue to develop as market opportunities, with global 
market share expected to increase from 12% to 28% by 2015, although demand will 
predominantly be for generic products.119   
The global drug pharmaceutical market experienced 5.6% compound annual growth between 
2006-2010 and is forecast to increase in value by 33.8% to reach $981.0 billion by 2015.120  
America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Middle East & Africa account respectively for 44.6%, 
29.2%, 25% and 1.3% of the global market value.121  Market share is fragmented with Pfizer, 
Merck & Co. Inc, AstraZenca PLC and GlaxoSmithKline PLC representing the largest four 
companies with 9.4%, 5.3%, 4.6% and 3% of the global drug market.122    
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The global generics market experienced 9.1% compound annual growth between 2007-2011 
and is forecast to increase in value by 46.1% to reach $273.6 billion by 2016.123  The global 
generics market represented 75% of the total pharmaceutical volume in 2011 and is expected 
to rise to 85.1% in 2016.124  America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East & Africa 
account respectively for 46%, 29.9%, 21.8% and 2.2% of the global generics market.125  The 
four largest generic manufacturers by sales are Teva Pharmaceutical, Mylan, Sandoz and 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, accounting for 50% of generic prescriptions in the US and 40% 
worldwide.126 127    
The global biotechnology market experienced a 9.9% compound annual growth between 
2007-2011 and is forecast to increase in value by 60.9% to reach $453.3 billion by 2016.128  
The medical/healthcare sub-segment comprised 67.4% of the global biotechnology market in 
2011.129  America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Middle East & Africa account respectively for 
45%, 27.7%, 24.8% and 2.4% of the global biotechnology market.130 
 
                                                 
123 (Marketline, 2012c p.7) 
124 (Marketline, 2012c p.2) 
125 (Marketline, 2012c p.10) 
126 (FiercePharma, 2010) 
127 (Harding, 2010 p.2) 
128 (Marketline, 2012b p.6) 
129 (Marketline, 2012b p.8) 
130 (Marketline, 2012b p.9) 
  59
vii. Changes in pharmaceutical practices in providing access to medicine 
Enhancing access to medicines in developing countries is not only motivated by human right 
responsibilities; developing markets can provide transnational corporations with long term 
profitable opportunities to access a large population with increasing wealth.  However, 
market incentives alone have not been sufficient to date to attract the level of investment 
required by the private sector.    
The HIV/AIDS epidemic was pivotal in changing the practices of pharmaceutical companies 
in providing access to medicine.  A landmark lawsuit by 39 pharmaceutical companies 
against the South African government was intended to prevent the passing of the ‘Medicines 
Act,’ legislation designed to gain access to affordable medicines.131  In 2000 the US 
withdrew and in April 2001 the lawsuit was fully withdrawn in response to significant public 
pressure in the form of international petitions and demonstrations.  The lawsuit was 
denounced as an effort by pharmaceutical companies to prevent cheaper medicines from 
being made available to patients and created a new norm for the protection of patents 
affecting health.132 133  In June 2001, the US similarly withdrew its WTO complaint with 
Brazil over patent law provisions that pressured patent holders to manufacture in Brazil in an 
effort to increase access to HIV/AIDS drugs.134 
“[AIDS] has helped catalyze the modern health and human rights movement, which leads far 
beyond AIDS, for it considers that promoting and protecting health and promoting and 
protecting human rights are inextricably connected.” 135  
Public opprobrium was exacerbated by the World Trade Organization agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  TRIPS was largely shaped by the 
International Property Committee, an industry coalition comprised of a number of 
pharmaceutical companies.136  TRIPS was adopted in 1994 and extended patent protection to 
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both pharmaceutical products and processes for a period of twenty years across all WTO 
members, regardless of the potential negative impact on drug accessibility.137  TRIPS did 
permit governments to issue compulsory licenses to use a patented product or process 
without an owner’s consent, subject to adequate remuneration and other restrictions, 
including a domestic use requirement.138  In 2001, the WTO Doha Declaration affirmed the 
right of WTO members to protect public health and promote access to medicines by deferring 
TRIPS obligations to pharmaceutical products to 2016 and affirming the right to issue 
compulsory licenses in national health emergencies.139  The TRIPS Council further agreed in 
2003 to waive the domestic use requirement for compulsory licensing subject to complex 
procedures and notification rules.140  However, the domestic use provision has rarely been 
waived due to its complexity; since adoption the notable exception has been Apotex for the 
treatment of 21,000 HIV patients in Rwanda.  Apotex has since stated that it “…is not likely 
to repeat the process…no second country has made a request under the regime because it’s so 
complicated.”141 
“TRIPS Plus” treaties subsequently negotiated by the United States and European Union with 
many developing countries as part of bilateral and regional trade pacts have served to impose 
more stringent intellectual property protection standards than TRIPS, strengthening the 
position of foreign pharmaceutical companies and limiting the introduction of generic 
pharmaceutical products.142  Since 2008 European Union customs authorities have on over 
twenty occasions seized and held shipments of generic medicines from India in transit to 
developing nations for up to eight months on suspicion of counterfeit products.143  In 2013, 
the pharmaceutical industry and Interpol established the Interpol Pharmaceutical Crime 
Programme to focus on the prevention of all types of “pharmaceutical crime,” including 
branded and generic drug counterfeiting, however the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance has 
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expressed concerns that the Interpol agreement represents “…a continuation of the efforts by 
branded companies to use such agencies as Customs and universal postal unions to target 
generics as counterfeits.”144 
Certain developing countries have used compulsory licensing successfully.  Since 2006 
Thailand has successfully issued compulsory licenses for Merck’s first line treatment for 
AIDS Efavirenz, Abbott’s AIDS drug Kaletra and Bristol Myers’ anti-platelet drug Plavix.145  
In 2008 Thailand issued compulsory licenses for three cancer drugs (having revoked a 
license for Glivec after Novartis agreed to provide its drug at no cost subject to certain 
income requirements) despite American pharmaceutical company lobbying for Thailand to 
be given Priority Foreign Country status, the most severe trade category and most likely to 
result in trade sanctions.146  Since 2001, Brazil has successfully used the threat of issuing 
compulsory licenses to reduce the price of Merck’s Stocrin, an HIV/AIDS medication, 
Roche’s Viracept, an AIDS-fighting drug and Merck’s ARV Kaletra.147  In 2007, Brazil 
issued a compulsory license for Merck’s Efavirenz after failing to negotiate a suitable price 
reduction.148     
Responses by the pharmaceutical sector have not been systematic; pharmaceutical companies 
have pursued different approaches in support of access to essential medicines.  The primary 
mechanisms pursued by the pharmaceutical sector for enhancing access to essential are 
detailed below and are accompanied by illustrative examples:  
 Investment in neglected disease research: Only 13 new neglected disease drugs were 
developed between 1975 and 1999, yet by the end of 2004 over 60 neglected disease drug 
projects were in progress.149  In 2010, the pharmaceutical industry contributed 16.5% 
($503.5 million) of all research and development funding for Type II and Type III 
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infectious diseases, with the philanthropic sector contributing 18.5% ($568.1 million) and 
the public sector contributing 65% ($2 billion).150   
 Developing country investment: Pharmaceutical companies have established a number of 
research centers dedicated to neglected infectious diseases.  The Novartis Institute for 
Tropical Diseases was established in 2002 as a partnership between Novartis and the 
Singapore Economic Development Board to find new medicines to treat neglected 
infectious diseases.  Novartis additionally acquired and dedicated in 2006 the Novartis 
Vaccines Institute for Global Health to the discovery of vaccines for neglected infectious 
diseases.  In 2003, AstraZeneca opened a research facility in Bangalore focused on TB.  
In 2004, Pfizer contributed to the establishment of the Infectious Disease Institute in 
Uganda as a major medical training and research center.  In 2010, GSK established the 
Tres Cantos Open Lab with seed funding of PND 5 million, providing first-class 
facilities, leading experts, mentors and limited financial funding to scientists focused on 
diseases of developing countries. 
 Collaborative product development: The pharmaceutical industry has played an increased 
role in supporting joint public private initiatives (JPPIs) to target specific diseases in 
developing countries.  The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative was founded in 1996, 
representing a partnership across 25 countries to research, design and develop AIDS 
vaccine candidates.  In 1999 the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) was established 
as a product development partnership model consisting of a network of more than 170 
pharmaceutical, academic and endemic-country partners in over 40 countries focused on 
anti-malarial research.  The TB Alliance was launched in 2000 as a product development 
partnership to support Tuberculosis (TB) research.  The GAVI alliance was also 
established in 2000 to fund vaccines for children in the world’s 70 poorest countries.  
Other public-private initiatives include, but are not limited to, the International 
Partnership for Microbicides (IPM), Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), Foundation for 
Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi). 
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 Improving health care delivery system: The Roll Back Malaria initiative commenced in 
1998 and includes over 500 partners supporting the scale up and coordination of malaria-
control efforts at the country level.  In 2002, the Global Fund was established as a 
partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected 
communities to finance country specific interventions to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, TB 
and Malaria. 
 Differential pricing: Pharmaceutical companies had been negotiating drug-by-drug and 
country-by-country agreements with a particular focus on HIV/AIDS, though the trend is 
progressing towards wider reaching initiatives and diseases.  The Accelerating Access 
Initiative (AAI) was established in 2000 and included several pharmaceutical companies 
that provided antiretroviral medicines at cheaper prices in developing countries and 
expanded related manufacturing capacity by granting voluntary licenses or non-assert 
declarations, contract manufacturing with generic manufacturers and technology transfer 
agreements.  The AAI was superseded by the rapid development of generic 
manufacturers and other negotiated arrangements such as by the Clinton Health Access 
Initiative, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
TB, and Malaria, and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  More 
recently, pharmaceutical companies have begun expanding differential prices to a wider 
range of products.  In 2009, GSK committed to cutting the prices for all drugs in 50 least 
developed countries to at least 25% of prices in the UK and US.  The limitation of 
differential pricing is that it is only effective if affordability levels are greater than the 
cost of manufacturing, otherwise donor subsidies and government support are required.151 
 Patent sharing and voluntary licensing: As of 2007, 31 voluntary licenses had been 
issued to generic companies, all but one related to ARVs, which provide restrictive 
covenants on the rights to produce a patented drug to third party manufacturers.152  In 
2010, the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) licensed patents on Darunavir to the 
Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), however the NIH license is considered useless for the 
manufacture and export to countries where Johnson & Johnson has a patent, due to the 
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company’s withdrawal from the MPP.153  In 2011, Gilead Sciences signed an agreement 
with the MPP to share intellectual property on a range of medicines to treat HIV.  In 
2013, ViiV Healthcare, a joint venture between GSK, Pfizer and Shionogi, licensed 
pediatric formulations of ViiV’s existing and pipeline HIV drugs to the MPP.   
 Donations: In 1987 Merck committed to donate Mectizan, a drug for the treatment of 
river blindness, for as long as was needed to eliminate the disease.  Since 2000, Novartis 
has been providing free treatment for all leprosy patients that in 2012 it extended by an 
additional $24.5m commitment.  GSK has committed to supply all the albendazole 
needed to eliminate lymphatic filariasis worldwide by 2020.  Pfizer donates medicines to 
the International Trachoma Initiative (ITI) to eliminate blinding trachoma and to the 
Diflucan Partnership Program (DPP) to treat cryptococcal meningitis and esophageal 
candidiasis.  However, donation programs have not always been optimally implemented; 
Pfizer commitment to donate fluconazole in South Africa was partly perceived as an 
effort to block generically manufactured drugs, being created in response to a generic 
importation filing and close to the expiration of its patent.154  Pfizer’s donation program 
was also initially considered to have been too slowly implemented and too restrictive by 
being limited to the public sector for people with cryptococcal meningitis.155 
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viii. Pharmaceutical Sector Activities Considered Important in Enhancing Access to 
Essential Medicines 
Corporations are noted to respond to business-society conflicts in four stages: no obligation; 
social obligation; social responsibility and social responsiveness.156  No obligation arises 
from companies perceiving that there is no connection between a social problem and their 
operations.157  Social obligation relates to companies responding to the minimally imposed 
legal or economic constraints.158  Social responsibility exists when a firm performs in 
accordance with prevailing social norms, values, performance and expectations.159  Social 
responsiveness relates to companies anticipating changes arising from current activities or 
emerging social problems.160  With regards to sweatshops, the athletic, footwear and apparel 
industries evolved from a perception of no obligation prior to 1989, to a perception of a 
social obligation between 1989-1995, to an understanding of social responsibility after 
1995.161  Below is a generalization of activities across the pharmaceutical sector considered 
important in enhancing access to essential medicines.. 
Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
Leadership and 
governance 162 
163 164 
 Refrain from conduct 
that encourages States 
to not act to promote 
right to health. 
 Existence of code of 
conduct in relation to 
access to medicine 
endorsed by board of 
directors and top 
management. 
 Adopt publicly 
available and objective 
human rights policy 
recognizing right to 
health and access to 
medicine. 
 Clear board accountability for 
management of access to 
medicine. 
 Practices exposed to public 
scrutiny through independent 
verification and accountability 
under a cooperative oversight 
model representative of 
different constituencies. 
 Systematic disclosure of access 
to medicine information. 
                                                 
156 (Sethi, 2003 p.69) 
157 (Sethi, 2003 p.69) 
158 (Sethi, 2003 p.69) 
159 (Sethi, 2003 p.69) 
160 (Sethi, 2003 p.69) 
161 (Sethi, 2003, pp. 28 - 75) 
162 (Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group, 2004 p.13) 
163 (Sethi, 2003 p.199-216) 
164 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
 Integration of human 
rights into strategies, 
policies, programs, 
projects and activities.  
 Policies recognize 
needs of disadvantaged 
communities and 
populations. 
 Clear delegation of 
authority for 
management of access 
to medicine. 
 Not utilizing transfer 
pricing practices for tax 
avoidance purposes. 
 
Pricing165 166 167 
168 
 Differential prices on 
case-by-case basis. 
 Product donations. 
 Preferential prices to all 
developing countries. 
 Price reductions limited 
to one or two disease 
initiatives. 
 Differential prices not 
publicly available. 
 Systematic, transparent, 
predictable and tiered global 
pricing for products. 
 Offer conditions published. 
 Prices are affordable to 
majority of population in 
developing countries. 
 Price reductions cover range of 
products relevant to health 
priorities in developing 
countries. 
 Disclose absolute quantity and 
value of donations, number of 
patients treated and donation 
tax benefit derived. 
 
Patents169 170  171 
172 
 Taking action against 
patent infringements in 
developing countries on 
a case-by-case basis. 
 
 Issue voluntary or 
royalty-free licenses. 
 Not applying for 
patents in least 
developed countries.  
 Ownership rights of 
intellectual property 
 Refrains from enforcing patents 
in developing countries that 
will exacerbate health 
problems. 
 Supports lifting TRIPS 
restrictions on export of generic 
versions of patented medicines 
                                                 
165 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.12-13) 
166 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.11) 
167 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
168 (Back & Saad, 2008, p. 10) 
169 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.14-21) 
170 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.13) 
171 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
172 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
negotiated on case-by-
case basis for JPPI 
drugs. 
 Responsible patenting 
of traditional 
medicines. 
 Access to proprietary 
research tools and 
databases. 
 Sharing compound 
libraries with public 
and not-for profit 
groups. 
 Consent to National 
Drug Regulatory 
Authorities using test 
data in least developed 
countries. 
 
in developing countries with no 
patent in force. 
 Patents foregone for products 
developed under JPPIs for 
infectious diseases. 
Lobbying173 174  Transparency in 
payments to and from 
developing country 
governments. 
 Compliance with state 
and national laws, 
including anti-
corruption laws. 
 Discloses to 
shareholders lobbying 
position on patents and 
related expenditure. 
 Respects TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
 Policies support good 
governance and pro-
poor policy 
environments. 
 Does not lobby for stronger 
patent protection than 
mandated by TRIPS or for 
weaker public health 
safeguards. 
 Publicly discloses lobbying 
position on patents and related 
expenditure. 
 Supports building and 
investment in local capacity 
and health infrastructure. 
 Does not lobby for stronger 
intellectual property rights in 
relation to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement. 
Joint Public 
Private 
Initiatives 
(JPPIs)175 176 177 
178 
 JPPIs commitments are 
for a limited term. 
 JPPI emphasis is on 
product donations. 
 JPPIs involve long-
term commitments to 
resolve targeted health 
problems. 
 JPPIs targeted to select 
countries or conditions, 
despite potential for 
wider effect. 
 JPPIs integrated in business 
policies. 
 JPPIs involve indefinite 
commitments to resolve 
targeted health problems. 
 JPPIs don’t exclude vulnerable 
populations. 
 JPPI objectives include 
                                                 
173 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.15-16) 
174 (DFID, 2005 p.14) 
175 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.18-19) 
176 (Gruskin & Raad, 2010 p.2) 
177 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
178 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
 No reporting on impact. 
 JPPIs work through an 
existing administrative 
structure. 
 Organize conferences 
on neglected disease 
topics. 
strengthening national health 
systems 
 JPPI focus on community 
participation and empowerment 
 Clear reporting on impact. 
 Governance of JPPIs is 
transparent and any conditions 
detailed. 
 Partnership interests fully 
disclosed. 
 
Research and 
Development179 
180 181 
 Company publishes 
proportion of R&D 
expenditure on 
infectious diseases. 
 Public commitment to 
contribute to research 
and development for 
neglected diseases. 
 Involved in JPPIs 
addressing R&D for 
infectious diseases 
 Publishes target R&D 
expenditure on 
infectious diseases. 
 Donate equipment. 
 Provide training 
courses for developing 
country researchers at 
academic institutions. 
 Seeking approval for 
new drug compounds in 
non-US markets prior 
to approval from US 
Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) 
and the EU's European 
Medicines Agency 
(EMEA). 
 Participate on scientific 
advisory or 
management boards of 
organizations 
conducting neglected 
disease research. 
 Evaluate new 
compounds proposed 
by external partners. 
 Expand research into 
pediatric formulations. 
 
 Involved in JPPIs addressing 
R&D for Type I, II and III 
diseases in relation to 
developing countries. 
 Company publishes target and 
actual R&D expenditure on 
Type I, II and III diseases in 
relation to developing 
countries. 
                                                 
179 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.20-21) 
180 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
181 (Back & Saad, 2008, p. 17) 
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Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
Product 
Testing182 183 
 Corporate 
responsibility 
acknowledged where 
regulations are weak. 
 Compliance with ICH 
Guidelines for Good 
Clinical Practice. 
 Compliance with WHO 
Guidelines for Good Clinical 
Practice for drug trials and 
Declaration of Helsinki on 
Ethical Principles for Medical 
Research involving Human 
Subjects. 
 Full results of all clinical trials 
published in registry accessible 
to third parties in accordance 
with 2012 International 
Standards for Clinical Trial 
Registries, World Health 
Organization. 
 
Product 
Marketing184 185 
186 
 Corporate 
responsibility 
acknowledged where 
regulations are weak. 
 Compliance with 
IFPMA Code of 
Pharmaceutical 
Marketing Practices 
 Transparent product 
labeling and 
distribution traceability 
 Compliance with WHO Ethical 
Criteria for Medicinal Drug 
Promotion. 
 Ethical promotion complaints 
upheld reported to 
shareholders. 
 Publicly disclose promotional 
and marketing policies, 
activities and costs. 
 
Drug Safety 
Monitoring187 
 Corporate 
responsibility 
acknowledged where 
regulations are weak. 
 Spontaneous reporting 
and response to adverse 
events. 
 Active drug safety monitoring 
by company for products 
introduced as warranted. 
 Disclosure of adverse drug 
reactions to regulatory 
authorities and WHO in all 
relevant countries. 
 
Product 
Delivery188 189 
190 191 
 Support sustainability 
of developing country 
governments through 
 Provide training in 
developing countries to 
health care providers. 
 Comply with current World 
Health Organization Good 
Manufacturing Practice 
                                                 
182 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
183 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
184 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
185 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.13) 
186 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
187 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
188 (Wu, 2012 p.97) 
189 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
190 (DFID, 2005 p.14) 
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Category Social Obligation Social Responsibility Social Responsiveness 
prompt payment of 
local taxes. 
 Guidelines 
 Mode of medicine delivery is 
respectful of medical ethics and 
culturally appropriate for target 
patient group. 
 Packaging is suited to local 
environment conditions and 
addresses counterfeiting. 
 Collaborate with national 
medicines procurement, storage 
and distribution systems in 
developing countries. 
 Medicines available without 
discrimination. 
 Explore production 
opportunities in developing 
countries. 
 Product unit sales by index 
country. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
191 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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ix. Analysis of alternative industry change approaches 
The ATMi is one of several approaches that have been adopted in an effort to change 
industry practices, each with varying levels of success.  Eight approaches have been 
examined and are summarized below, including: market incentive / award schemes, 
voluntary public commitment / membership schemes, legislative mandates, actionable 
governance indicators, investment indices, voluntary reporting guidelines, voluntary 
reporting standards and product labeling schemes.  Although the approaches are presented 
and analyzed individually, different approaches have been combined; the Transportation 
Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act of 2000 (legislation) created 
the car rollover ratings (actionable governance indicator) on showroom new-car stickers 
(product labels).  Each individual approach has its corresponding strengths and weaknesses 
specific to the problem or issue being addressed; a generalization follows of the common 
themes:  
1. Market incentive or award schemes, such as the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality 
Award, are useful for spurring continued innovation.  An incentive or award scheme can 
help to promote a leading standard and redirect company investments.  Participation 
levels however can be limited due to capacity, scale and funding challenges and a focus 
on rewarding a small number of leaders may not necessarily facilitate industry wide 
changes. 
2. Voluntary public commitments / associations, such as the United Nations Global 
Compact, Fair Labor Association and Sustainable Forest Initiative are important in 
developing international standards across a wide stakeholder group.  However, voluntary 
commitments and associations can have weak and / or subjective standards that are 
supported by inadequate independent verification, limiting the ability to compare and 
analyze performance. 
3. Legislative mandates, such as the Clean Air Act of 1970, have been effective in 
promoting minimum standards.  Legislative mandates however may not incentivize 
continued innovation, can be associated with significant implementation and enforcement 
costs, require significant political capital to develop, and are limited by national borders.  
“Problems that are widely dispersed and locally variable, or characterized by wide 
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differences in consumers’ and citizens’ preferences, may not lend themselves to uniform 
rules, subsidies, or taxes.”192 
4. Actionable governance indicators (AGI), such as the ATMi, Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), World Bank ‘Doing Business’ (DB), Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ 
(FIW), Aid Transparency Index (ATI), and Transparency International ‘Corruption 
Perceptions Index’ (CPI) aggregate information from different sources into a format 
intended to holistically capture and benchmark performance to empower user decision 
making.  AGIs distil complex data into simple ratings and present the information in a 
format designed to be user-centered, allowing performance to be understood, compared 
and acted upon.193   AGIs however can involve a degree of subjectivity in the weightings 
and measures applied which can limit the ability to action results when not supported by 
full transparency. 
5. Investment indices, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good and Calvert 
Social Index, utilize screening criteria to group companies with similar investment 
characteristics.  However, investment indices can have low correlations, weak predictive 
validity, non-transparent methodologies and don’t detail relative or absolute 
performance.194 195   FTSE4Good ESG Ratings (another AGI example) is acknowledged 
as one example of emerging systems associated with investment indices that 
quantitatively measure and compare the risk and performance of environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) performance.    
6. Voluntary reporting guidelines, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), are 
intended to promote transparency by standardizing the reporting of performance.  
Although relative performance is denoted by ratings, ratings are a reflection of the level 
of transparency rather than performance.  Information users are required to analyze 
reported information to evaluate and compare performance, which can be challenging 
within and across sectors. 
                                                 
192 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 14) 
193 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 2) 
194 (Chatterji & Levine, 2006, pp. 41, 48) 
195 (Chatterji & Levine, 2007, p. 1) 
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7. Voluntary reporting standards, such as SA 8000 and ISO 14000, are designed to provide 
absolute rather than relative levels of performance.  Voluntary reporting standards signal 
a generic cross-sector minimal level of conformance that is independently verified, but do 
differentiate between different performance levels. 
8. Product label initiatives, such as Energy Star, are focused on empowering consumers by 
providing information at the point of purchase.  Product labels however provide limited 
information to investors and do not attest to the operations of entire organizations. 
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x. Industry Change Examples 
Category Scope Example Theory of Change Achievements Strengths Limitations 
Market 
incentives / 
Award scheme 
National 
since 1987 
Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality 
Award 
Guide, evaluate and 
recognize leading 
overall organizational 
quality  
 33‐plus state, local, 
and sector 
Baldrige‐based 
programs.196 
 Inspired 106 
international quality 
programs.197 
 Every public $1 spent 
on the Baldrige 
Program, provides 
$820 in benefits to the 
U.S. economy.198 
 
 Objective evaluation 
criteria and process. 
 Multi-sector 
initiative. 
 Draws attention to 
best performers, not 
laggards. 
 Limited capacity / 
scale; 69 and 39 
national applicants 
in 2011 and 2012 
respectively.199 
 
Voluntary 
public 
commitment / 
associations  
International 
since 2000 
United Nations 
Global Compact 
Voluntary 
commitment to 
continuously improve 
implementation of key 
principles 
 Over 10,000 corporate 
participants in over 
130 countries.200 
 Annual reporting of 
progress requirement 
by participants. 
 Lack of standardized 
reporting measures 
to compare 
performance. 
 Performance not 
verified. 
 
Legislative 
mandates 
National 
since 1970 
Clean Air Act of 
1970 
Mandate minimum 
standard through 
legislation; Limit 
industrial emissions 
 Reduced 60% of 
dangerous air 
pollutants that cause 
 Mandated and 
enforced minimum 
standards. 
 Requires 
government 
intervention that is 
not always 
                                                 
196 (Department_of_Commerce, 2012, p. 14) 
197 (Department_of_Commerce, 2012, p. 14) 
198 (Department_of_Commerce, 2012, p. 15) 
199 (NIST, 2013) 
200 (UNGC, 2013) 
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Category Scope Example Theory of Change Achievements Strengths Limitations 
smog, acid rain and 
lead poisoning.201 
 New cars today 
generate 98% less 
smog-forming 
pollutants than in 
1970.202 
 
 Monetizable benefits 
exceeded the direct 
compliance costs by 
four to one.203 
politically feasible. 
 Costly to implement. 
 Does not incentivize 
continued 
innovation. 
Actionable 
governance 
indicators 
International 
since 2008 
Carbon Disclosure 
Project 
Collects, standardizes, 
and reports corporate 
behavior information 
on climate change and 
water scarcity, on 
behalf of market 
forces, including 
shareholders and 
purchasing 
corporations 
 
 Almost 6,000 company 
respondents.204 
 655 financial 
institutions with assets 
of US$78 trillion were 
signatories to the CDP 
2012.205 
 Carbon Disclosure 
Leadership Index 
(CDLI) recognizes 
the top-scoring 10% 
of respondents. 
 Multi-sector 
initiative. 
 Detailed scoring 
methodology. 
 Third party 
verification is not 
required, but is 
encouraged as part 
of the CDP scoring 
methodology. 
Investment 
Indices 
International 
since 2001 
FTSE4Good Influence investment 
markets to recognize 
better corporate 
environmental and 
social practice 
 Over $10.1 trillion of 
assets under 
management 
incorporate ESG.206 
 52.3% return for 
FTSE4Good Global 
 Selection criteria is 
raised every year. 
 288 companies 
removed from index 
for failure to meet 
inclusion 
standards.208 
 Targeted only 
toward investors. 
 FTSE4Good ESG 
Ratings providing 
absolute and relative 
scores are available 
for paid subscription.
                                                 
201 (EPA, 2013) 
202 (EPA, 2013) 
203 (EPA, 1999, p. v) 
204 (CDP, 2012, p. 2) 
205 (CDP, 2012, p. 3) 
206 (FTSE, 2011, p. 7) 
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Category Scope Example Theory of Change Achievements Strengths Limitations 
Index (USD total 
return since launch)207 
 793 companies added 
to index since 
launch.209 
 
Voluntary 
reporting 
guidelines 
International 
since 2000 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
Mainstream 
standardized and 
integrated 
sustainability reporting 
 2,304 GRI reports 
published in 2011.210 
 Provides sector 
specific guidance.   
 
 Third party 
verification is not 
required, but is 
encouraged as part 
of the GRI scoring 
methodology. 
 
Voluntary 
reporting 
standards 
International 
since 1998 
SA 8000 Creates common 
language for 
measuring social 
compliance 
 Over 1.4 million 
workers are employed 
in SA8000-certified 
facilities, across 65 
industrial sectors.211 
 Universal application 
regardless of 
company size, 
location and sector. 
 Certification requires 
third party 
verification. 
 
 Accountability 
standards are 
fragmented across 
different providers / 
certifiers. 
Product label 
initiatives 
National 
since 1992 
Energy Star Empower consumers 
through product 
labeling to save money 
and protect the 
environment. 
 Over 60 Energy Star 
product categories.212 
 12,600 Energy Star 
certified buildings.213   
 80% public awareness 
 Strict guidelines set 
by EPA and US 
Department of 
Energy. 
 All products must be 
 Product rather than 
organizational 
specific. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
208 (FTSE, 2011, p. 11) 
207 (FTSE, 2011, p. 11) 
209 (FTSE, 2011, p. 11) 
210 (GRI, 2013) 
211 (SAI, 2010) 
212 (EnergyStar, 2013) 
213 (EnergyStar, 2013) 
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Category Scope Example Theory of Change Achievements Strengths Limitations 
of Energy Star label.214 certified by EPA-
recognized 
certification body 
(CB) and subject to 
ongoing verification 
testing.215 
 
                                                 
214 (EnergyStar, 2013) 
215 (EnergyStar, 2013) 
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xi. AGI leading practices 
AGIs need to embody a credible compromise that delicately navigates competing interests to 
motivate desired actions by users and in turn positively influence the behaviors of disclosers.  
Users represent the most important component in designing AGIs, however additional 
important considerations include the needs and abilities of disclosures, and the credibility of 
both the rating system and agency: 
 Clear theory of change: AGIs need to clearly specify what their purpose, mission and 
vision.  Purpose relates to the change desired, mission relates to the strategy to effect the 
change and vision relates to their conception of the desired future state. 
 Need for user centered policies: AGIs need to focus both on the needs and interests of 
information users and their ability to comprehend the information provided, as well as the 
needs, interests and capacities of disclosing organizations.216  “They seek to embed new 
facts in the decision-making routines of information users and to embed user responses 
into the decision making of disclosers.”217  Embedding new information in user’s decision 
making requires the information to be valued, acquired at a low cost, available when and 
where decisions are made, that is comprehensible, and connected to a perceived 
immediate or long-term gain.    
 Need for specified targets, scope and structure: The specific entities or organizations that 
are viewed as responsible for the policy problem need to be clearly defined.218  In 
addition, the boundaries of information disclosure need to be clearly specified.219  Data 
disclosed needs to be standardized in terms of content and format in order to be 
comparable.220   
 Importance of actionable and timely indicators: AGIs are intended to capture information 
to spur action rather than measure outcomes; “…means of capturing information on the 
                                                 
216 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 11) 
217 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 11) 
218 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 41) 
219 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 42) 
220 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 43) 
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design, capacities, performance and immediate impacts of governance systems rather 
than longer-term outcomes.” 221  The links of indicators to outcomes are complex, 
possibly subject to long lags and often not well-understood.222  The relationship of an 
indicator to outcomes is not as important as when and how reform is possible given the 
actionable data with clearly specified discloser targets.223  As there is no one data source 
for measuring governance, the nature and dimensions of governance need to be clearly 
defined and measures designed to capture the relevant information.224  AGIs need to 
clarify the link between indicator values and reform action, provided the impact of 
exogenous factors on indicator values is small.225  A clear definition is required of how 
the indicators are constructed, what they measure and the source of raw data.226  
Subjective indicators based on expert perceptions may be difficult to action and change 
and can be widely dispersed.227  Review processes and statistical techniques can however 
mitigate subjective biases.228  Fact-based data can also require subjective interpretation in 
the review of information and evidence.229  Simple rules that summarize objective 
information have been noted to generally outperform decisions based on the same 
information plus qualitative information that is accompanied by subjective judgments.230    
 Importance of transparency: Continuous improvement and ongoing research are 
important to refine and improve what will always be imperfect governance indicators.231  
The meaning of scores or data for aggregate indicators can be difficult to interpret in real 
terms without accompanying actionable disaggregated information.232  Public and 
                                                 
221 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 341) 
222 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 9) 
223 (Trapnell, 2011, pp. 324-325) 
224 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 6) 
225 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 322) 
226 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 323) 
227 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 11) 
228 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 324) 
229 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 324) 
230 (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009, p. 164) 
231 (Chatterji & Levine, 2006, p. 48) 
232 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 321) 
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professional scrutiny of the content and methodology of indicators is essential for the 
credibility of governance indicators.233  “Lack of consensus about metrics impairs the 
credibility of transparency.”234  Rating organizations must also be trusted for a rating 
system to be effective.235 
 Importance of complementary measures: Complementary measures of a single indicator 
can potentially result in greater accuracy provided the same concepts are measured 
consistently.236  Aggregating several measures into one indicator can reduce errors in 
sampling and in measuring any individual indicator, aggregation can also mitigate 
perception biases generated by expert assessments.237   
 Acknowledgement of measurement error: Measurement errors are inherent in all 
governance indicators due both to intrinsic measurement challenges and the broad nature 
of governance.238  Survey sampling errors and variations in opinion can reduce the 
accuracy of a specific indicator.239  It is therefore important that survey questions on 
governance are specific and not open to interpretation.240  Errors also exist because no 
one specific indicator can be a perfect measure of broad concepts of governance.241  
Aggregation methods provide the opportunity to calculate a margin of error for both the 
aggregate indicator itself and its component individual indicators that should be explicitly 
acknowledged to provide users with a clear indication of whether data can be 
compared.242   
                                                 
233 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 32) 
234 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 174) 
235 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 57) 
236 (Trapnell, 2011, pp. 319-320) 
237 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 320) 
238 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007, p. 24) 
239 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007, p. 24) 
240 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 21) 
241 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007, p. 24) 
242 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 320) 
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 Limited ability to compare performance over time: Comparisons over time are difficult as 
methodologies, governance standards and sources of data can change over time.243  
Aggregation of many data points can obscure both successful reforms in particular areas 
and bad scores.244   
 Challenge of prioritization: Weighting of data points appropriately is difficult and 
requires a clear understanding of the theoretical relationship between the construct being 
studied and the measured data points.245  Absent clear links between indicators and 
outcomes, it can be difficult to prioritize reform.  Inappropriate weightings can create the 
risk of ‘reform illusion,’ where isolated changes are made for the sole purpose of 
showing progress on specific indicators.246  Weightings applied may also not align with 
the perspectives of different users.247 
 Importance of complete and accurate information: Voluntary disclosure by business and 
other organizations can be incentivized by the risk of liability, publicized crises, shifts in 
public attitudes and competitive dynamics.248  Only two studies have explored how non-
profit organizations respond to independent agent ratings and rakings, with only one 
study related to the US News And World Report demonstrating that law school rankings 
did influence management decisions.249  One study of how for-profit firms respond to 
non-governmental environmental ratings noted greater relative improvements in poor 
performing firms that were in highly regulated industries and had low-cost opportunities 
to exploit.250  However, the quantity and quality of information that a company 
voluntarily provides is often inadequate to inform decision making by the public, hence 
the need for policymakers to push organizations to reveal more.251  A number of studies 
                                                 
243 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 320) 
244 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 320) 
245 (Trapnell, 2011, p. 320) 
246 (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Trapnell, 2011, p. 10) 
247 (Chatterji & Levine, 2006, p. 41) 
248 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 38) 
249 (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 919) 
250 (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 932) 
251 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 38) 
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have shown that company management practices and performance do change in response 
to government mandatory information disclosure programs.252  One example includes the 
legislation requiring manufacturers to annually disclose toxic pollution by factory and 
chemical, which halved pollution levels within the first ten years.253  Government 
typically intervenes when information asymmetry either increases the risks borne by the 
public, impacts the quality of critical services, perpetuates unacceptable discrimination or 
social inequities, or facilitates corruption.254  Government involvement is however not 
always essential, the Carbon Disclosure Project demonstrates the ability of user actions 
(i.e. investors) to be effectively triggered to cause disclosers (ie. companies) to advance a 
public good (i.e. by demonstrating improvement in environmental performance). 
 Need for sustainability: To be sustainable, AGIs need to demonstrate gains in use, 
accuracy and scope over time.255  Policies with high political sustainability have the 
greatest chance of success; a subset of disclosers benefit from disclosure through 
competitive advantage, and dispersed users of information form political coalitions to 
press effectively for better disclosure.256  
                                                 
252 (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, pp. 919-920) 
253 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 29) 
254 (Fung et al., 2007, pp. 40-41) 
255 (Fung et al., 2007, p. 11) 
256 (Fung et al., 2007, pp. 112-113) 
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xii. ATMi background and 2010 and 2012 results 
The ATMi was established based on public online questionnaires and expert roundtable 
consultations, with stakeholder consultations being repeated every two years.  An Expert 
Review Committee, Technical Subcommittee, and Advisory Committee, consisting of 
various stakeholder groups active in supporting access to essential medicines, are leveraged 
to develop and refine the methodology.  MSCI ESG Research is responsible for conducting 
the research and analysis.  The MSCI team obtains direct company information via an online 
questionnaire and email and phone conversations that is then verified against third party 
information.   
The ATMi presently includes only originator pharmaceutical companies, excluding generic 
providers, biotechnology companies, distribution companies and small to medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  The ATMi selects the world’s 20 largest pharmaceutical companies 
based on size, determined primarily but not exclusively on market capitalization as at 
December 31st, 2011, and portfolio relevance.   
The ATMi focuses on 33 priority diseases, consisting of a combination of the top 10 diseases 
communicable, top 10 non-communicable diseases and 14 neglected tropical diseases based 
on global disease burden.257  The index additionally focuses on maternal conditions, neonatal 
infections and ad hoc regional health challenges.258  The disease scope is based on global 
WHO Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) data.259  The scope of products in the index 
includes medicines, investigational therapeutic and preventative vaccines, diagnostics, 
microbicides, vector control products and platform technologies.260 
Each pharmaceutical company is assessed on seven technical areas with a weighted 
distribution: general access to medicine management (10%); public policy and market 
influence (10%); research and development (20%); equitable pricing, manufacturing and 
distribution (25%); patents and licensing (15%); capability advancement in product 
development and distribution (10%); and product donations and philanthropic activities 
                                                 
257 (AMI, 2012b, pp. 15-18) 
258 (AMI, 2012b, pp. 15-18) 
259 (AMI, 2012b, pp. 15-18) 
260 (AMI, 2012b, p. 19) 
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(10%).261  Each technical area is assessed across four strategic pillars with a weighted 
distribution: commitments (25%), transparency (25%), performance (40%), and innovation 
(10%).262  101 indicators across the technical areas and strategic pillars are used to develop 
the index scores. 
The ATMi is published every two years.  In 2008, the ATMi benchmarked the policies and 
practices of the 17 largest drug originators and three generics.  In 2010, the ATMi analyzed 
20 drug originators and seven generic companies.  The 2012 ATMi was published in 
November 2012 and analyzed 20 drug originator companies, excluding generics.  For each 
pharmaceutical company ATMi provides an overall score, a score for each technical area and 
a report card of leading practices, highlights of changes and suggested areas for 
improvement. 
In 2010 GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co. and Novartis represented the top ranking 
pharmaceutical companies in order, while Ranbazy, Cipla and Dr Reddy’s represented the 
top ranking generic companies.  In 2012 GlaxoSmithKline was again the leader followed by 
Johnson & Johnson.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261 (AMI, 2012b, pp. 23-26) 
262 (AMI, 2012b, pp. 23-26) 
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2010 ATMi Results 
 
 
Source: ATMi Index 2010 
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2012 ATMi Results 
 
Source: ATMi Index 2012 
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xiii. Study details 
Subject Survey A - Interviews 
Objective:  Obtain independent expert views on important elements in evaluating the 
performance of the pharmaceutical sector in relation to access to essential medicines. 
Target Population:  Objective and knowledgeable global health figures focused on 
improving access to essential medicines. 
Time Estimate:  1 hour per interview 
Study Approach: Over the phone interview / written survey. 
Leading Questions: 
 Should health be considered a basic human right?  If so, what should the human right to 
health encompass and how could it best be protected and promoted? 
 What do you consider the most important elements to improving access to essential 
medicines in developing countries? 
 What should the role of the pharmaceutical sector be in improving access to essential 
medicines in developing countries?  How should this role evolve in the next five to ten 
years? 
 What are the important characteristics of a pharmaceutical company in promoting an 
optimal level of access to essential medicines in developing countries? 
 What is your awareness and understanding of the ATMi? 
 What have you observed to be the reaction to the ATMi by the public, civil society, 
pharmaceutical companies and investors? 
 What do you perceive to be the strengths of the ATMi?  What are your suggestions for 
improving the ATMi? 
 
Subject Survey B - Interviews 
Objective:  Obtain independent human rights activist views from developing countries on 
important elements in promoting the human right to health. 
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Target Population:  Objective and knowledgeable human rights figures in developing 
countries. 
Time Estimate:  1 hour per interview 
Study Approach: Over the phone interview / written survey. 
Leading Questions: 
 Should health be considered a basic human right?  If so, what should the human right to 
health encompass and how could it best be protected and promoted? 
 What do you consider the most important elements to improving access to essential 
medicines in developing countries? 
 What should be the role of leading NGOs in the south to promote health as a human 
right?  What is necessary to catalyze further action?  What questions remain unanswered? 
 What should the role of the pharmaceutical sector be in improving access to essential 
medicines in developing countries?  How should this role evolve in the next five to ten 
years? 
 What is your awareness and understanding of the ATMi? 
 What have you observed to be the reaction to the ATMi by the public, civil society, 
pharmaceutical companies and investors? 
 What do you perceive to be the strengths of the ATMi?  What are your suggestions for 
improving the ATMi? 
 
Subject Survey C - Interviews 
Objective:  Understand the minimum requirements necessary for the ATMi to be 
incorporated into investment criteria. 
Target Population:  Leading investors that have a focus on social issues as part of their 
investment fund criteria. 
Time Estimate:  1 hour per interview 
Study Approach: Over the phone interview / written survey. 
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Leading Questions: 
 What criteria do you utilize to evaluate a potential investment opportunity in a 
pharmaceutical company? 
 What do you consider the social obligations of pharmaceutical companies?  Is this an 
important element in identifying investment opportunities? 
 What is your understanding of the issue of access to essential medicines in developing 
countries? 
 Should health be considered a basic human right?  If so, what should the human right to 
health encompass and how could it best be protected and promoted? 
 What do you consider to be the role of the pharmaceutical sector in improving access to 
essential medicines in developing countries?  How should this role evolve in the next five 
to ten years? 
 What is your awareness and understanding of the ATMi? 
 What would be your minimum requirements for a third party index, such as the ATMi, to 
be incorporated into investment fund criteria? 
 
Subject Survey D – Interviews  
Objective:  Obtain perspectives of pharmaceutical companies on the ATMi. 
Target Population: Pharmaceutical companies included in the ATMi.  
Time Estimate:  1 hour per interview 
Study Approach: Over the phone interview / written survey. 
Leading Questions: 
 Should health be considered a basic human right?  If so, what should the human right to 
health encompass and how could it best be protected and promoted? 
 What is the level of senior management, CEO and Board awareness of ATMi? 
 What is the level of agreement with ATMi scores published for your company and other 
companies? 
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 What is the perceived usefulness / value of ATMi? 
 What is the relevance of ATMi to your business operations, partner engagement and 
hiring? 
 What are your suggestions for improving the ATMi? 
 
Subject Survey E – Interview  
Objective:  Understand approach of ATMi Foundation to effectively engage the public, civil 
society, pharmaceutical companies and investors. 
Target Population:  Access to Medicine Foundation 
Time Estimate:  2 hours 
Study Approach: Over the phone interview / written responses. 
Proposed Questions: 
 Should health be considered a basic human right?  If so, what should the human right to 
health encompass and how could it best be protected and promoted? 
 Are you consistently able to reach an appropriate consensus across the stakeholder 
roundtables, expert review committee and advisory committee in key decision making?  
How are conflicts in opinions resolved? 
 What is the level of assurance obtained for information submitted by pharmaceutical 
companies to derive the ATMi?  Is information received from pharmaceutical companies 
independently verified? 
 How does the ATMi Foundation determine what information submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies to publish? 
 What is the process for agreeing and finalizing an index score with each respective 
pharmaceutical company? 
 How does the ATMi Foundation communicate its results to the public, pharmaceutical 
companies (both included and excluded in the index), investors and civil society? 
 What social media tools does the ATMi Foundation utilize to engage the public? 
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 How does the ATMi Foundation engage in investor relations? 
 How does the ATMi Foundation engage pharmaceutical companies that participate and 
don’t participate in the index? 
 How does the ATMi Foundation engage civil society? 
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xiv. ATMi 2012 measurement framework indicator summary 
 
  93
 
  94
 
Source data: ATMi Methodology Report 2012 Stakeholder Review – May 2012 
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xv. Top DALYs (‘000s) in LMIC and LIC (3% discounting, Age weights) 
Cause 
CD vs 
NCD 
 
WORLD 
DALY 
TOTAL DALY 
in LMIC and 
LIC 
Medicines 
Available 
In 
AMI 
In 
EML 
Lower respiratory infections CD  94 511  91 088 Y Y Y 
Diarrhoeal diseases CD  72 777  71 005 Y Y Y 
Unipolar depressive disorders NCD  65 472  50 058 Y Y Y 
HIV/AIDS CD  58 513  47 772 Y Y Y 
Ischaemic heart disease NCD  62 587  44 860 Y Y Y 
Prematurity and low birth weight CD  44 307  41 997 Y N Y 
Birth asphyxia and birth trauma CD  41 684  39 962 N N N/A 
Neonatal infections and other CD  40 433  38 772 Y Y Y 
Cerebrovascular disease NCD  46 591  35 600 Y Y N 
Malaria CD  33 976  33 862 Y Y Y 
Tuberculosis CD  34 217  31 591 Y Y Y 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary NCD  30 196  25 074 Y Y Y 
Refractive errors NCD  27 745  23 533 N N N/A 
Congenital abnormalities NCD  25 280  21 646 Y N N 
Hearing loss, adult onset NCD  27 356  20 929 N N N/A 
Protein-energy malnutrition CD  17 462  16 750 Y N Y 
Cataracts NCD  17 757  16 204 N N N/A 
Alcohol use disorders NCD  23 738  16 004 Y N N 
Measles CD  14 853  14 812 Y Y Y 
Iron-deficiency anaemia CD  16 152  14 714 Y N Y 
Schizophrenia NCD  16 769  13 805 Y N N 
Diabetes mellitus NCD  19 705  13 551 Y Y Y 
Asthma NCD  16 317  12 921 Y Y Y 
Bipolar affective disorder NCD  14 425  11 623 Y N Y 
Meningitis CD  11 426  10 975 Y Y Y 
Osteoarthritis NCD  15 586  10 913 Y Y N 
Cirrhosis of the liver NCD  13 640  10 012 Y Y N 
Pertussis CD  9 882  9 739 Y Y Y 
Nephritis/nephrosis NCD  9 057  7 712 Y Y N 
Nutritional/endocrine disorders NCD  10 446  7 584 Y N Y 
Abortion CD  7 424  7 142 Y Y N 
Macular degeneration and other NCD  9 297  7 034 Y N N 
Trachea/bronchus/lung cancers NCD  11 766  6 732 Y N N 
Epilepsy NCD  7 854  6 615 Y Y N 
Hypertensive heart disease NCD  8 020  6 391 Y N Y 
Maternal sepsis CD  6 535  6 152 Y Y N 
Lymphatic filariasis CD  5 941  5 928 Y Y N 
Alzheimer and other dementias NCD  11 158  5 727 Y N N 
Stomach cancer NCD  7 491  5 667 Y N N 
Migraine NCD  7 765  5 614 Y N N 
Source: WHO Global Burden of Disease 2004 (2008 Update) 
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xvi. Projected 2030 Top DALYs (‘000s) in LMIC and LIC (3% discounting, Age 
weights) 
Cause 
CD vs 
NCD 
 
WORLD 
DALY 
TOTAL DALY in 
LMIC and LIC 
Unipolar depressive disorders NCD  84 784  68 590 
Ischaemic heart disease NCD  75 450  59 520 
Cerebrovascular disease NCD  58 205  48 185 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease NCD  51 876  47 166 
Lower respiratory infections CD  43 800  41 872 
Refractive errors NCD  36 911  32 379 
Hearing loss, adult onset NCD  39 584  31 905 
HIV/AIDS CD  34 139  27 148 
Neonatal infections and other conditions CD  25 425  24 782 
Birth asphyxia and birth trauma CD  25 340  24 663 
Prematurity and low birth weight CD  25 389  24 469 
Cataracts NCD  25 377  23 525 
Diabetes mellitus NCD  30 890  21 991 
Diarrhoeal diseases CD  21 610  20 923 
Alcohol use disorders NCD  25 385  18 327 
Osteoarthritis NCD  21 752  16 124 
Asthma NCD  19 188  15 881 
Congenital abnormalities NCD  17 683  15 384 
Schizophrenia NCD  18 003  15 281 
Tuberculosis CD  15 666  14 889 
Trachea/bronchus/lung cancers NCD  19 385  14 338 
Malaria CD  12 897  12 751 
Bipolar affective disorder NCD  15 111  12 616 
Macular degeneration and other NCD  15 446  12 457 
Alzheimer and other dementias NCD  18 989  10 567 
Nephritis/nephrosis NCD  10 379  8 945 
Hypertensive heart disease NCD  10 424  8 687 
Stomach cancer NCD  10 307  8 428 
Liver cancer NCD  9 204  8 066 
Cirrhosis of the liver NCD  10 654  7 683 
Nutritional/endocrine disorders NCD  9 837  7 394 
Glaucoma NCD  8 263  7 099 
Drug use disorders NCD  9 699  7 068 
Protein-energy malnutrition CD  7 209  6 951 
Oesophagus cancer NCD  7 425  6 685 
Iron-deficiency anaemia CD  7 182  6 494 
Epilepsy NCD  7 437  6 351 
Panic disorder NCD  7 644  6 333 
Breast cancer NCD  8 929  6 286 
Migraine NCD  7 583  5 634 
Source: WHO Global Burden of Disease 2004 (2008 Update) 
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xvii. Evaluation of 2012 ATMi Indicators for Completeness and Accuracy 
Category Suggested Measures for Inclusion Suggestions for Strengthening Leading Practice Standard 
General Access 
to Medicine 
Management263 
264 265 
 Practices exposed to public scrutiny through independent verification 
and accountability under a cooperative oversight model representative 
of different constituencies. 
 Existence of code of conduct in relation to access to medicine 
endorsed by board of directors and top management. 
 Publicly disclose objective human rights policy recognizing right to 
health and access to medicine. 
 Integration of human rights into strategies, policies, programs, 
projects and activities.  
 Policies recognize needs of disadvantaged communities and 
populations. 
 
 A.II.1. Should specify the systematic (i.e. standardized and 
complete) information required to be disclosed in terms of 
access to essential medicines by country and product. 
 A.III.2 Should recognize participation on scientific advisory 
or management boards of organizations conducting 
neglected disease research. 
Public Policy & 
Market Influence 
266 267 
 Policies support good governance and pro-poor policy environments. 
 Not lobbying for stronger intellectual property rights in relation to the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
 Not utilizing transfer pricing practices for tax avoidance purposes 
 B.II.1 Disclosure of advocacy activities should require100% 
of index countries to be covered rather than half. 
 B.II.5: Promotional and marketing policies, activities and 
costs should be publicly disclosed. 
 B.III.2 Anti-competitive behavior should include all 
anticompetitive practices across globe, rather than 
excluding IP anticompetitive behavior and being limited to 
only index countries. 
 
 
Research & 
Development 268 
 Seeking approval for new drug compounds in non-US markets prior 
to obtaining FDA and EMEA approval. 
 C.II.1 Company should publish target and actual R&D 
expenditure on Type I, II and III diseases in relation to 
                                                 
263 (Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group, 2004 p.13) 
264 (Sethi, 2003 p.199-216) 
265 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
266 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.15-16) 
267 (DFID, 2005 p.14) 
268 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.20-21) 
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Category Suggested Measures for Inclusion Suggestions for Strengthening Leading Practice Standard 
269 270 271 272 273 
274 275 
 Expand research into pediatric formulations. developing countries on an annual basis. 
 C.II.4 Full results of all clinical trials should be published in 
registry accessible to third parties in accordance with 2012 
International Standards for Clinical Trial Registries, World 
Health Organization. 
 C.III.9 Should comply with WHO Guidelines for Good 
Clinical Practice for drug trials. 
 
Manufacturing 
and Distribution 
276 277 278 279 280 
281 282 
 Support sustainability of developing country governments through 
prompt payment of local taxes. 
 Transparent product labeling and distribution traceability 
 Prices are affordable to majority of population in developing 
countries. 
 Price reductions cover range of products relevant to health priorities 
 D.I.6 Marketing approval and product registration should be 
obtained before product launch rather than up to 12 months 
after product launch. 
 D.II.2 Should require systematic, transparent, predictable 
and tiered global pricing for products, rather than average 
prices for certain tiers or percentage reduction. 
                                                 
269 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
270 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
271 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
272 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
273 (Wu, 2012 p.97) 
274 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
275 (Back & Saad, 2008, p. 17) 
276 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.12-13) 
277 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.11) 
278 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
279 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.23-24) 
280 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.13) 
281 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
282 (Back & Saad, 2008, p. 10) 
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Category Suggested Measures for Inclusion Suggestions for Strengthening Leading Practice Standard 
in developing countries. 
 Ethical promotion complaints upheld reported to shareholders. 
 Comply with current World Health Organization Good Manufacturing 
Practice Guidelines 
 Mode of medicine delivery is respectful of medical ethics and 
culturally appropriate for target patient group. 
 Packaging is suited to local environment conditions and addresses 
counterfeiting. 
 Active drug safety monitoring by company for products introduced as 
warranted. 
 Disclosure of adverse drug reactions to regulatory authorities and 
WHO in all relevant countries. 
 Explore production opportunities in developing countries. 
 Provide training in developing countries to health care providers. 
 Product unit sales by index country. 
 
 D.II.2 Offer conditions should be published detailing any 
distribution restrictions. 
 D.III.1 Equitable/tiered pricing programs should span 100% 
of index countries for relevant health priorities.   
Patents and 
Licensing 283 284 
285 286 
 Responsible patenting of traditional medicines. 
 Patents foregone for products developed under JPPIs for infectious 
diseases. 
 E.I.1 Commitment to not file patents should be for all index 
countries or at least all developing countries, rather than 
being limited to LDCs. 
 E.I.1. Should refrain from enforcing patents in developing 
countries that will exacerbate health problems. 
 
 
 
 
Capability 
Advancement in 
Product 
 Governance of JPPIs is transparent and any conditions detailed. 
 JPPIs don’t exclude vulnerable populations. 
 Clear reporting on outcomes and impact of JPPIs. 
 F.III.2 / F.III.3 / F.III.4 / F.III.5 JPPIs should involve 
indefinite commitments to resolve targeted health problems 
by eradicating disease(s). 
                                                 
283 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.14-21) 
284 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.13) 
285 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
286 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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Category Suggested Measures for Inclusion Suggestions for Strengthening Leading Practice Standard 
Development and 
Distribution 287 
288 289  
 Partnership interests fully disclosed. 
 Consent to National Drug Regulatory Authorities using test data in 
least developed countries. 
 
 
Drug Donations 
and 
Philanthropic 
Activities 290 291 
292 
 Disclosure of donation tax benefit derived.  G.III.4 Alignment of philanthropic activities with national 
health system development plans should be stated in 
percentage, rather than absolute terms. 
                                                 
287 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.18-19) 
288 (Gruskin & Raad, 2010 p.2) 
289 (M Moran et al., 2011 p.85) 
290 (Bluestone et al., 2002 p.12-13) 
291 (CoreRatings, May 2003 p.11) 
292 (Hunt, 2008 p.1-25) 
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xviii. Evaluation of 2012 ATMi Indicators 
The following represents an evaluation of all 101 indicators and their corresponding scoring 
scales detailed fully in the Access to Medicine Index 2012 Report, pages 112 to 133. 
 Indicator Specific Data Source 
General 
Access to 
Medicine 
Management 
A.I.1 Y N 
A.I.2 Y Y 
A.I.3 Y Y 
A.II.1 Y Y 
A.II.2 N Y 
A.III.1 Y N 
A.III.2 Y N 
A.III.3 Y N 
A.III.4 Y N 
A.IV.1 Y N 
Public Policy 
and Market 
Influence 
B.I.1 N N 
B.I.2 Y Y 
B.I.3 N N 
B.I.4 Y N 
B.I.5 Y Y 
B.II.1 Y Y 
B.II.2 N Y 
B.II.3 Y Y 
B.II.4 N Y 
B.II.5 N Y 
B.II.6 Y Y 
B.III.1 Y N 
B.III.2 Y N 
B.III.3 Y N 
B.IV.1 Y N 
Research and 
Development 
C.I.1 N N 
C.I.2 N N 
C.I.3 N N 
C.I.4 Y Y 
C.II.1 N Y 
C.II.2 Y Y 
C.II.3 Y Y 
C.II.4 Y Y 
C.II.5 Y Y 
C.III.1 Y Y 
C.III.2 Y N 
C.III.3 Y N 
C.III.4 Y N 
C.III.5 Y N 
C.III.6 Y Y 
C.III.7 Y N 
C.III.8 Y Y 
C.III.9 Y Y 
C.IV.1 Y N 
Equitable 
Pricing, 
Manufacturing 
and 
Distribution 
D.I.1 N N 
D.I.2 N N 
D.I.3 N Y 
D.I.4 N Y 
D.I.5 N Y 
D.I.6 N N 
D.II.1 Y Y 
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 Indicator Specific Data Source 
Equitable 
Pricing, 
Manufacturing 
and 
Distribution 
D.II.2  N Y
D.II.3 Y Y
D.II.4 Y Y
D.II.5  Y Y
D.III.1  Y N
D.III.2  Y N
D.III.3  Y N
D.III.4 Y N
D.III.5  Y N
D.III.6  Y N
D.IV.1  Y N
D.IV.2  Y N
Patents and 
Licensing 
E.I.1  N N
E.I.2  Y Y
E.I.3  N N
E.I.4  Y Y
E.II.1  N Y
E.II.2  Y Y
E.II.3  N Y
E.III.1  Y N
E.III.2  Y N
E.III.3  Y Y
E.III.4  Y N
E.III.5  Y N
E.IV.1  Y N
Capability 
Advancement 
in Product 
Development 
and 
Distribution 
F.I.1  N N
F.I.2  Y N
F.I.3  Y Y
F.I.4  Y Y
F.II.1  Y Y
F.III.1  Y N
F.III.2  Y N
F.III.3  Y N
F.III.4  Y N
F.III.5  Y Y
F.IV.1  Y N
F.IV.2  Y N
Product 
Donations & 
Philanthropic 
Activities 
G.I.1 N N
G.I.2  N N
G.I.3  N N
G.I.4  N N
G.II.1  Y Y
G.II.2  Y Y
G.II.3  N Y
G.III.1 N Y
G.III.2  N N
G.III.3  Y N
G.III.4  N Y
G.IV.1  Y N
G.IV.2 Y N
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xix. Count of Media Reports Containing “Access to Medicine Index” Excluding Social Media  
 
*Note: Media count was based on analysis of all news from all sources for all date ranges based on the term “Access to Medicine Index” in Factiva, Lexis / 
Nexis, ABI / Inform Complete and Business Source Complete, accessed on March 3-4, 2013.  Identical duplicates were eliminated when title, date and source 
matched. 
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xx. Count of Media Reports Containing “Access to Medicine Index” Including Social Media  
 
*Note: Media count was based on analysis of all news from all sources for all date ranges based on the term “Access to Medicine Index” in Factiva, Lexis / 
Nexis, ABI / Inform Complete and Business Source Complete, accessed on March 3-4, 2013.  Identical duplicates were eliminated when title, date and source 
matched.
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xxi. Indexed share price movements of 2008 ATMi 5 worst performers (6/16/08 release)  
 
xxii. Indexed share price movements of 2008 ATMi 5 best performers (6/16/08 release) 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional accessed on February 11, 2013 
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xxiii. Indexed share price movements of 2010 ATMi 3 worst performers and 2 worst decreases (6/21/10 release) 
 
xxiv. Indexed share price movements of 2010 ATMi 3 best performers and 2 best improvers (6/21/10 release) 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional accessed on February 11, 2013 
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xxv. Indexed share price movements of 2012 ATMi 3 worst performers and 2 worst decreases (11/28/12 release) 
 
xxvi. Indexed share price movements of 2012 ATMi 3 best performers and 2 best improvers (11/28/12 release) 
Source: Bloomberg Professional accessed on February 11, 2013
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xxvii. Analysis of civil sector public recognition of ATMi results (as of 2/10/13) 
Organization 2010 Index Link on 
Website 
2012 Index Link 
on Website 
Analysis of ATMi 
Results on Website 
World Health Organization (WHO) Yes – 11/12 Yes – 11/12 No 
GAVI No No No 
The Global Fund No No No 
UNAIDS No No No 
UNICEF No No No 
Médecins Sans Frontières No No No 
Health Action International  No No Yes – 6/08 (Critique) 
Oxfam Yes No Yes – 2010 only 
Department for International 
Development 
Yes No No 
Clinton Health Access Initiative No No No 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Yes No No 
UNITAID No No No 
UNDP No No No 
Knowledge Ecology International No No No 
Pan American Health Organization No No Y  - Reference to BBC 
article 11/12 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative No No No 
Human Rights Watch No No No 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) No No No 
Section 27 No No No 
Lawyers Collective No No No 
Thai AIDS Treatment Action Group 
(TTAG) 
No No No 
Conectas Direitos Humanos No No No 
Justiça Global No No No 
Paz y Esperanza (Peace and Hope) No No No 
Asian Human Rights Commission No No No 
Global Rights No No No 
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xxviii. Analysis of private sector recognition of ATMi results and ranking (as of 
2/10/13) 
Rank Organization 2010 Index 
Referenced in 
2011/2010 CSR / 
Annual Report  
2012 Index Link on 
Website 
Analysis of 2012 ATMi 
Results on Website 
20
12
 
20
10
 
1 1 GlaxoSmithKline plc Yes Yes Y – Press release on 11/12 
with response by CEO 
2 9 Johnson & Johnson No Yes Y – Statement on 11/12 with 
response by VP, Global 
Market Access  
3 5 Sanofi No Yes Y – Statement on 11/12 with 
response by VP, CSR  
4 2 Merck & Co Yes No - only link to 
index, not results 
No 
5 4 Gilead Sciences No No No 
6 8 Novo Nordisk A/S No Yes Yes – Statement on 11/12 by 
VP, Global Stakeholder 
Engagement 
7 3 Novartis AG No No No – Ranking result noted for 
2012 on website 
8 17 Merck KGaA No - Index 
recognized but not 
result 
Yes Yes – Press release on 11/12 
by Executive Board Member 
of Merck and Head of the 
Merck Serono 
9 14 Bayer AG No - Index 
recognized but not 
result 
Yes Yes – website statement on 
11/12 
10 6 Roche Holding Ltd No No No 
11 11 Pfizer Inc No No – only 
acknowledgement of 
index 
No 
12 15 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co 
No No No 
13 10 Abbott Laboratories 
Inc 
No No No 
14 13 Eli Lilly & Co. No No No 
15 16 Eisai Co Ltd No No No 
16 7 AstraZenca Plc No - Index 
recognized but not 
result 
No – details 2010 
results 
No 
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Rank Organization 2010 Index 
Referenced in 
2011/2010 CSR / 
Annual Report  
2012 Index Link on 
Website 
Analysis of 2012 ATMi 
Results on Website 
20
12
 
20
10
 
17 12 Boehringer-Ingelheim Yes No No 
18 18 Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co. 
No No No 
19 20 Daiichi Sankyo Co. 
Ltd. 
No No No 
20 19 Astellas Pharma Inc. No No No 
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xxix. Indexed share price movements of top 4 and worst 4 ATMi performers since 2008 
 
Note: Top performers since 2008 of ATMi include GSK, Sanofi, Merck & Co and Gilead Sciences.   
           Worst performers since 2008 of ATMi include Takeda, Astellas, Daiichi and Eisai. 
Source: Bloomberg Professional accessed on February 11, 2013 
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xxx. Analysis of Changes in Company Performance from 2010 to 2012 
The following information has been sourced directly from the Access to Medicine Index 2012 report.  Positive developments have 
been noted in black while negative developments have been noted in red.  Lack of discernible action is noted by blank cells.   
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
1 1 
G
l
a
x
o
S
m
i
t
h
K
l
i
n
e
 
p
l
c
 - Created 
Developing 
Countries and 
Market Access 
(DCMA) unit 
centralizing 
LDC business 
units, aligned 
incentives with 
volume 
growth. 
- Sponsored > 
30 access 
related 
conferences 
and workshops 
- Introduced 
more 
advanced 
ethical 
marketing 
codes of 
conduct with 
standards 
that exceed 
IFPMA 
marketing 
code. 
- Larger R&D 
pipeline for new 
medicines and 
adaptive research 
for the poor. 
- Established Tres 
Cantos Open Lab 
Foundation with 
initial donation of 
USD 1.9 million 
to focus on 
projects for the 
developing world, 
with treatments for 
neglected diseases 
developed to be 
made available 
royalty free to 
LDCs. 
- Product quality recalls 
due to quality issues. 
- Introduced inter-
country tiered pricing 
for 32 and intra-country 
tiered pricing for seven 
out of 33 products in 
several relevant 
countries. 
- Six ethical breaches; 
sale of unregistered 
pharmaceutical 
products to improper 
product advertising.  
2012 fine of USD 3 
billion for misleading 
promotion of range of 
drugs including 
rosiglitazone 
(Avandia®) for period 
1997 to 2004. 
- Pleaded guilty in 2011 
to unlawfully 
promoting two 
antidepressant drugs 
(Paxil® and 
Wellbutrin®) for 
unapproved uses in US. 
- Issued NEVLs for 
HIV medicine only 
through GSK-
Pfizer joint 
initiative, ViiV. 
-Entered in 
negotiations with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool through ViiV. 
- Broad range of 
examples 
disclosed of 
building 
pharmacovigilance 
systems in 
multiple relevant 
countries. 
- Dedicated 
20% profits 
from LDCs to 
strengthen 
health care 
infrastructure in 
LDCs (USD 6 
million in 
2011). 
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0
1
2
 
2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
 
2 9 
J
o
h
n
s
o
n
 
&
 
J
o
h
n
s
o
n
  - Consolidated 
access 
activities to 
one business 
unit, the 
Global 
Pharmaceutical 
Access 
Committee 
within Janssen 
pharmaceutical 
business and 
with board-
level 
involvement. 
 - Improved 
transparency 
and more 
explicit 
codes of 
conduct. 
- April 2011 
SEC 
kickbacks to 
Iraqi 
authorities to 
secure 19 
contracts in 
UN Oil for 
Food 
Program. 
- Acquisition of 
Crucell, increased 
pipeline dedicated 
to innovation in 13 
relevant diseases 
and adaption of 
products for seven 
relevant diseases. 
- Increased disclosure 
of tiered pricing 
programs 
- Greater public 
transparency 
towards TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
- Public disclosure 
of limited range of 
patent statuses. 
- Issued non-
exclusive voluntary 
licenses for all 
three of its 
HIV/AIDS 
products and 
engaged in related 
technology 
transfer. 
- Withdrew from 
Medicines Patent 
Pool formal 
negotiations in 
December 2011. 
- Public acceptance 
of practice of 
compulsory 
licensing, but only 
as a last resort. 
- Commits not to 
enforce patents in 
UN LDCs related 
to index diseases. 
- Broad range of 
examples 
disclosed of 
building 
pharmacovigilance 
systems in 
multiple relevant 
countries. 
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2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
- Commenced 
issuing NEVLs for 
three of its HIV 
products, however 
one doesn't cover 
manufacturing and 
the other is limited 
to India. 
 
3 5 
S
a
n
o
f
i
 - Hosted > 200 
access related 
workshops and 
meetings. 
- Established 
Asia-Pacific 
Therapeutic 
Strategic Unit 
and specific 
research and 
development 
unit focusing 
on 
communicable 
diseases. 
  - Introduced 
adaptive product 
research. 
- Rolled out intra-
country tiered pricing 
for large number of 
countries but for limited 
products. 
- Greater disclosure 
of positions on 
TRIPS and 
enforcement and 
filing of patents in 
LDCs. 
- Commits not to 
file or enforce 
patents in LDCs 
  - Sanofi Espoir 
Foundation 
established in 
late 2010, 
committed in 
2011 US 10.7 
supporting 15 
access-
orientated 
projects and two 
single-drug 
donation 
programs 
targeting 
trypanasomiasis. 
 
4 2 
M
e
r
c
k
 
&
 
C
o
     -Started Merck for 
Mothers Initiative 
to prevent 
hemorrhage and 
pre-eclampsia and 
to focus on family 
planning. 
  - Granted four 
NEVLs over last 
two years for its 
HIV/AIDS and 
diabetes products. 
- Will not assert 
patent for 
Efavirenz/ 
Stocrin® in South 
Africa 
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2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
- Lobbying 
relevant country 
governments such 
as Indonesia and 
Philippines for 
stronger 
intellectual 
property 
protection. 
 
5 4 
G
i
l
e
a
d
 
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
s
    - Has better 
standards for 
bribery and 
corruption 
    - Engaged with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool 
- Increasing use of 
non-exclusive 
voluntary licenses. 
- Issued NEVLs for 
two ARVs 
Viread® and 
Truvada®. 
  - Commenced 
single drug 
donation 
program to treat 
visceral 
leishmaniasis in 
addition to not-
for-profit 
pricing 
arrangements in 
India. 
  
6 8 
N
o
v
o
 
N
o
r
d
i
s
k
 
A
/
S
   - Access 
orientated 
policy 
commitments
- Full 
commitment 
to not apply 
data 
exclusivity 
  
- Increased R&D 
adaptive pipeline. 
   - Changing 
Diabetes in 
Children program 
provides 
integrated 
community 
support. 
- Introduced 
single-drug 
donation 
program for 
non-patented 
human insulin 
in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
7 3 
N
o
v
a
r
t
i
s
 
A
G
   - 
Implemented 
third-party 
auditing and 
enforcement 
mechanisms. 
- Increased R&D 
adaptive pipeline. 
  - Contesting 
decision by Indian 
Government over 
application and 
TRIPS 
compatibility of 
patentability 
criteria. 
 
    
8 17 
M
e
r
c
k
 
K
G
a
A
  - Developed 
access to 
medicine 
charter with 
board-level 
responsibility. 
   - Commenced 
investment in 
innovative and 
adaptive R&D for 
poor 
- First time disclosure 
of tiered pricing 
program. 
  - Minilabs 
initiative in 
collaboration with 
Global Pharma 
Health Fund 
allows for rapid 
field-based 
detection of 
potentially 
substandard 
medicines 
covering 58 drug 
compounds, most 
on WHO EML. 
 
- Greater 
disclosure 
9 14 
B
a
y
e
r
 
A
G
  - Publishing 
more 
information on 
access 
acivities, 
including 
targets and 
performance. 
    - Introduced intra-
country four-tiered 
differential pricing 
scheme. 
- Greater disclosure 
of positions on 
TRIPS and 
enforcement and 
filing of patents in 
LDCs. 
- Contesting 
decision by Indian 
Government over 
compulsory license 
for cancer 
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0
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0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
medication. 
 
10 6 
R
o
c
h
e
 
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
L
t
d
    - Increased R&D 
adaptive pipeline, 
but has no relevant 
innovative 
molecules. 
 
  -Entered in 
negotiations with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool. 
 
   
11 11 
P
f
i
z
e
r
 
I
n
c
     - Out of court 
settlement in 2011 
for clinical trial 
regulatory breach 
in Nigeria of 
meningitis 
antibiotic 
Trovan® in 1996. 
- Implemented tiered 
pricing for all relevant 
products in every 
country where present. 
-Entered in 
negotiations with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool through ViiV.
 
    
12 15 
B
r
i
s
t
o
l
-
M
y
e
r
s
 
S
q
u
i
b
b
C
o
  - Improved 
transparency 
and has more 
explicit 
codes of 
conduct. 
    -Entered in 
negotiations with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool. 
   
13 10 
A
b
b
o
t
t
 
L
a
b
o
r
a
t
o
r
i
e
s
I
n
c
      - Acquired in 2010 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
and the Healthcare 
Solutions division of 
Piramal Healthcare Ltd, 
branded generic 
manufacturer. 
- Noted evidence of 
 - Increased 
investment in 
capacity building 
for R&D, 
including 
diagnostic and 
treatment service 
in Western Kenya 
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2
0
1
0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
litigation and regulatory 
proceedings regarding 
patents and the 
application of TRIPS 
flexibilities, but no 
details provided. 
and healthcare 
public-private 
partnership with 
Tanzanian 
government. 
14 13 
E
l
i
 
L
i
l
l
y
 
&
 
C
o
.
    - Improved 
transparency 
and more 
explicit 
codes of 
conduct. 
 - Commenced 
investment in 
innovative R&D 
for poor. 
- Subject of 
several legal cases 
relating to clinical 
trials resulting in 
negative rulings or 
regulatory notices.
- New Open 
Innovation Drug 
Discovery 
program, a web-
based tool to allow 
external 
researchers to 
register molecules. 
       
15 16 
E
i
s
a
i
 
C
o
 
L
t
d
  - Dedicated 
Global Access 
Strategies unit 
and board 
ownership of 
access.  
Created a 
management 
system to track 
and reward 
progress on 
 - Has better 
standards for 
bribery and 
corruption 
- Improved 
investment in 
research in NTD 
-Introduced tiered 
pricing for breast 
cancer drugs and 
introduced affordable 
pricing schemes for 
epilepsy and unipolar 
depressive disorder 
drugs in India. 
- Lack of evidence 
of follow through 
of NEVL 
commitments 
  - Introduced 
single drug 
donation 
program for 
NTD (2010) to 
treat lymphatic 
filariasis in 
developing 
countries, 
beginning in 
2013. 
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2
0
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0
 Co. Commitments 
/ Engagement 
Public 
Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
access related 
initiatives. 
16 7 
A
s
t
r
a
Z
e
n
c
a
 
P
l
c
       - Product recalls 
- Committed only to 
intra-country tiered 
pricing with schemes 
outside the scope of the 
index.  
- Established 
manufacturing plants in 
China and Algeria 
- 28 marketing and 
sales breaches during 
2010-11. 
-Reneged on 
commitment to not 
to file or enforce 
patents in LDCs, 
where there is a 
good market. 
- Provided 
research capacity 
support to Peking 
University for a 
Clinical 
Pharmacology 
Unit and 
participated in 
More Medicines 
for Tuberculosis 
consortium and 
Medicines for 
Malaria Venture. 
- New program 
to support 
improved health 
and lifestyle 
choices for 
adolescents in 
India and 
Zambia. 
17 12 
B
o
e
h
r
i
n
g
e
r
-
I
n
g
e
l
h
e
i
m
     - Expanded R&D 
pipeline for 
relevant diseases 
such as asthma, 
cerebrovascular 
disease, diabetes 
mellitus and 
malaria. 
- Fined in Ukraine in 
2010 for false claims 
about a drug. 
- Significantly 
increased number 
(from 6 to 14) of 
non-assert 
declarations for its 
anti-retroviral. 
-Entered in 
negotiations with 
Medicines Patent 
Pool. 
- Making More 
Health launched to 
support social 
entrepreneurs to 
advance 
sustainable health 
solutions across 
developing 
countries. 
  
18 18 
T
a
k
e
d
a
 
P
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
 
C
o
.     - Added two new 
molecules for 
unipolar 
depressive 
disorder and 
invested in 
adaptive research 
to explore effects 
of tropical 
climates on its 
- Acquired generics 
manufacturer Nycomed, 
increasing present in 
relevant markets and 
expanding vaccine 
division, including 
work on polio virus 
vaccine. 
- Improved anti-
counterfeiting program. 
 - Introduced new 
quality assurance 
framework to 
analyze seized 
drug samples. 
- Greater 
alignment with 
Millennium 
Development 
Goals, including 
improving child 
health and 
prevention of 
HIV/AIDS. 
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Policy 
R&D Pricing, 
Manufacturing & 
Distribution
Patents & 
Licensing 
Capability 
Advancement 
Donations & 
Philanthropy 
products. 
 
 
19 20 
D
a
i
i
c
h
i
 
S
a
n
k
y
o
 
C
o
.
 
L
t
d
.
     -Acquired 
generics 
manufacturer 
Ranbaxy; added 
six relevant 
products for in 
scope diseases: 
nephritis, cirrhosis 
of the liver, 
meningitis, 
ischaemic heart 
disease, trachoma 
and maternal 
health conditions. 
 
-Implemented tiered 
pricing schemes 
covering more than half 
of its relevant products, 
though in limited 
markets, inter-country 
tiered pricing for four 
of 17 relevant products 
and intra-country tiered 
pricing for nine out of 
17 relevant products. 
    
20 19 
A
s
t
e
l
l
a
s
 
P
h
a
r
m
a
 
I
n
c
.
     - New R&D 
collaboration with 
Drugs for 
Neglected 
Diseases initiative 
for three NTD and 
a public-private 
partnership with 
TI Pharma, Merck 
KGaA and Swiss 
TPH to develop 
pediatric form of 
Praziquantel to 
treat 
schistosomiasis. 
 - Lack of evidence 
of follow through 
of NEVL 
commitments 
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xxxi. Analysis of Different Benchmarking Approaches of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
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R
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P
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P
u
b
l
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L
e
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P
h
a
r
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l
 
C
o
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W
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h
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C
o
m
p
a
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e
s
 
C
o
r
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
 Pharmaceutical 
Sector: 
Philanthropy or 
Good Business? 
2
0
0
3
 
O
n
c
e
 Policy, 
practice and 
disclosure in 
management 
of emerging 
market 
responsibilities 
11 largest 
international 
pharmaceutical 
companies by 
market 
capitalization 
Company 
survey 
6 possible 
scores per 
indicator. 
5; equal 
weighting 
applied 
Yes Yes GSK (#1), 
Novartis 
(#2), 
Merck (#3) 
and Roche 
(#4) 
Eli Lily 
(#10), 
Abbot 
(#9), 
Pfizer (#8) 
and 
Johnson 
and 
Johnson 
(#7) 
 
I
n
t
e
r
f
a
i
t
h
 
C
e
n
t
e
r
 
o
n
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 Benchmarking 
AIDS: 
Evaluating 
Pharmaceutical 
Company 
Responses to 
the Public 
Health Crisis in 
Emerging 
Countries 
2
0
0
6
 
O
n
c
e
 HIV/AIDS and 
neglected 
diseases in 
Emerging 
Markets 
15 
pharmaceutical 
companies 
addressing at 
least one of 
HIV/AIDS, TB 
or Malaria. 
Company 
survey, 
direct verbal 
and written 
communicat
ions and 
expert 
committee 
review. 
5 point scale 12; equal 
weighting 
applied 
Yes Yes Ranking 
only by 
theme, not 
overall. 
Ranking 
only by 
theme, not 
overall. 
  122
I
n
d
e
x
 
T
i
t
l
e
 
Y
e
a
r
 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
T
h
e
m
e
 
S
c
o
p
e
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
S
c
o
p
e
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
 
S
c
o
r
i
n
g
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
S
c
o
r
e
s
 
B
y
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
P
r
o
f
i
l
e
s
 
P
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
L
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
P
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
W
o
r
s
t
 
P
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
O
x
f
a
m
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 Investing for 
Life: Meeting 
Poor People’s 
Needs for 
Access to 
Medicines 
Through 
Responsible 
Business 
Practices 
2
0
0
7
 
O
n
c
e
 Access to 
essential 
medicines; 
pricing, R&D 
and patents 
12 
pharmaceutical 
companies in 
terms of market 
capitalization 
and 1 
biotechnology 
company due its 
product portfolio 
Company 
interviews 
and publicly 
available 
data 
None noted, 
observations 
aligned to 
HBR CSR 
spectrum. 
None 
noted 
Not 
applicable 
Yes Ranking 
only by 
theme, not 
overall. 
Ranking 
only by 
theme, not 
overall. 
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
 
S
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
I
n
d
e
x
 Sustainability 
Reporting of the 
World’s Largest 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
2
0
0
9
 
O
n
c
e
 Environmental 
and social 
sustainability 
reporting and 
transparency 
Companies on 
Fortune Global 
500 and Fortune 
500 
Pharmaceuticals 
sector lists (up to 
30) 
Review of 
websites and 
direct verbal 
and written 
communicat
ions. 
Three points 
for 
qualitative 
topics, five 
points for 
quantitative 
topics and 7 
points for 
human rights 
topics. 
Not 
detailed 
No Yes Bristol-
Myers 
Squibb 
(#1), 
Sanofi 
(#2), 
Abbott 
(#3) and 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
(4) 
 
Gilead 
Sciences 
(#18), Eli 
Lilly 
(#16), 
Novartis 
(#13) and 
Pfizer 
(#11) 
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 Sustainable 
Performance 
Leaders in 
Pharmaceuticals 
2
0
1
0
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 Environment, 
social and 
governance. 
Publicly traded 
company on a 
major global 
exchange, 
minimum market 
capitalization of 
$1 Billion USD 
and must have 
published CSR 
report.  
CSR reports 
and direct 
verbal and 
written 
communicat
ions, and 
government 
filings; must 
be publicly 
available 
 
Proprietary 
and not 
detailed.  
Consists of 
numeric or 
Boolean 
(Yes or No) 
175 Detailed 
information 
only 
accessible 
by 
subscribers 
Yes Roche 
(#2), 
Astrazenca 
(#3), 
Merck & 
Company 
(#4) and 
Abbott 
(#5) 
Eisai 
(#24), Eli 
Lilly 
(#23), 
Astellas 
(#21), and 
Takeda 
(#20). 
P
a
t
i
e
n
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V
i
e
w
 The Corporate 
Reputation of 
Pharma in 2012 
– the Patient 
Perspective 
2
0
1
2
 
A
n
n
u
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 Extent to 
which 
pharmaceutical 
companies are 
meeting the 
expectations of 
patients and 
patient groups 
29 leading 
pharmaceutical 
companies 
Survey 600 
international
, national, 
regional and 
local patient 
groups for 
opinions 
(European 
bias).  
Minimum of 
25 
completed 
responses 
per company 
required for 
inclusion. 
 
Yes 6 Only 
accessible 
for fee; Yes 
Only 
accessible 
for fee; 
Yes. 
Gilead 
Sciences 
(#2), 
Novartis 
(#3), Pfizer 
(#5) and 
Abbott 
(#6) 
Only 
accessible 
for fee. 
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 2012 CPA-
Zicklin Index of 
Corporate 
Political 
Accountability 
and Disclosure 
2
0
1
2
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 Board 
oversight and 
disclosure of 
direct and 
indirect 
political spend 
Top 200 
companies, as 
measured by 
market 
capitalization at 
the end of 2011, 
in the S&P 500 
Review of 
websites and 
direct verbal 
and written 
communicat
ions. 
Yes = Full 
points; No = 
0 points; 
Partial = 
Half points.  
29; with 
indicators 
having 
different 
point 
weights 
Yes No Merck & 
Co (#1), 
Gilead 
Sciences 
(#4), 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
(#11) and 
Pfizer 
(#12) 
Eli Lily & 
Company 
(#40), 
Bristol-
Myers 
(#29) and 
Abbott 
Laboratori
es (#20) 
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xxxii. Pharmaceutical Industry Lobbying Profile, 2012 
 
Client/Parent Total 
Pharmaceutical Rsrch & Mfrs of America $18,530,000
Eli Lilly & Co  $11,096,000
Pfizer Inc $10,210,000
Merck & Co $9,510,000 
Amgen Inc $9,310,000 
Biotechnology Industry Organization $7,540,000 
Novartis AG $7,367,000 
Abbott Laboratories $6,200,000 
Sanofi $6,174,000 
Johnson & Johnson  $5,880,000 
Bayer AG $5,800,321 
Roche Holdings $5,320,846 
GlaxoSmithKline $4,920,000 
Medtronic Inc $4,900,000 
AstraZeneca PLC $3,570,000 
Bristol-Myers Squibb $3,320,000 
Merck KGaA $3,050,000 
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries $3,040,000 
CH Boehringer Sohn $2,940,618 
Baxter International $2,590,000 
Eisai Co Ltd $2,410,000 
Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals $2,240,000 
Astellas Pharma USA $2,220,000 
Cardinal Health $2,165,000 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn $2,118,253 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (Accessed March 12, 2013)
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xxxiii.  Gilead Sciences Product Portfolio and Research Pipeline 
Note: Cells denoted in yellow are specifically referenced in the analysis of the report.  All product and pipeline information obtained 
from Gilead website in February 2013. 
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xxxiv.  Sanofi Product Portfolio and Research Pipeline 
Note: Cells denoted in yellow are specifically referenced in the analysis of the report.  All product and pipeline information obtained 
from Sanofi website in February 2013. 
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xxxv.  Novo Nordisk A/S Product Portfolio and Research Pipeline 
Note: Cells denoted in yellow are specifically referenced in the analysis of the report.  All product and pipeline information obtained 
from Novo Nordisk website in February 2013. 
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